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CARSTENS, CHRISTIAN B. Retrospective Discounting and 
Augmenting in an Overjustification Procedure. (1983) 
Directed by: Dr. John J. Seta. Pp. 181 
Salient reward procedures can lead to decrements in the 
subsequent value or intrinsic motivation for an interesting 
target activity. Attributional analyses explain this phe­
nomenon in terms of discounting: performing an interesting 
activity for an incentive induces an external attribution of 
causality, which is associated with a corresponding decrease 
in perceived intrinsic motivation. Nonattributional hypoth­
eses explain the value decrement in terms of differential 
performance during the treatment session. Expected rewards 
can produce distraction, hurried performance, stereotyped 
responding, and other effects, all of which can interfere 
with the enjoyment of the target activity. Three experiments 
were conducted in which differential performance during the 
treatment session was ruled out by the use of a retrospec­
tive misattribution procedure. Adult subjects performed 
target activities while listening to background music. 
After the "treatment" session, but prior to the free-choice 
test session, experimental subjects were told that the music 
contained subliminal messages either encouraging or dis­
couraging target activity performance. There were, in fact, 
no subliminal messages, so that all subjects were treated in 
the same way during the initial performance session. Over-
justification or countercompliance effects occurred only 
when the instructions included a salient attempt at control 
coupled with negatively valenced means of control. Neither 
feedback indicating functional control nor salient attempts 
at control were sufficient to produce countercompliance. 
The results were discussed in terms of cognitive balance 
theory. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Within the past three decades, psychologists have 
adapted learning principles to the therapeutic modification 
of human behavior. These procedures have produced successful 
results in industry, in educational settings, and with insti­
tutionalized populations once regarded as untreatable. The 
learning-principles approach (e.g., Skinner, 1953) provided 
some distinct advantages to the field of therapeutic behavior 
change relative to more traditional approaches. Among these 
advantages was parsimony: treatment programs could be designed 
and evaluated with an emphasis on the functional relationships 
between environmental variables and observable behavior. This 
functional analytic approach allowed the prediction of behav­
ior change without reference to theoretical constructs such 
as super-egos, attitudes, cognitions, and selves. 
Concurrent with the rise of behavior modification, 
experiments derived from cognitive dissonance theory (Fes-
tinger, 1957) began to produce results that were not easily 
explained within the context of a Skinnerian approach to 
human behavior. Studies in the area of forced compliance 
(e.g., Bern, 1967; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) suggested 
that small rewards were more effective than larger rewards 
in producing certain kinds of behavior change. In the forced 
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compliance procedure, subjects were offered either a small 
or a large reward for engaging in some counterattitudinal 
activity. Postreward measures indicated a larger degree of 
attitude change, consistent with the rewarded activity, for 
the small-reward subjects relative to the large-reward sub­
jects. This effect has been explained in terms of the 
subject1s attributions about the functional cause of the 
rewarded behavior (Bern, 1967; Kelley, 1967). The large reward 
provided sufficient justification for the counterattitudinal 
activity, so that minimal attitude change occurred. The small 
reward, however, was theoretically insufficient to justify 
the behavior, so subjects tended to misattribute their activ­
ities to changes in attitude. This phenomenon, and related 
findings, led many social psychologists to believe that the 
effects of rewards and other behavior modification proced­
ures may best be understood by taking into account the pro­
cesses of cognitive inference. 
The finding that "insufficient" rewards were instru­
mental in producing attitude change led to speculation con­
cerning the effects of "oversufficient" rewards (deCharms, 
1968t Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). If insufficient 
rewards lead subjects to attribute performance to internal 
factors, then oversufficient rewards might produce a bias 
towards a perception of external causality. To the extent 
that task engagement and disengagement are mediated by per­
ceptions of locus of causality, one outcome of oversufficient 
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rewards might be a postreward performance decrement relative 
to prereward levels. This phenomenon, termed the overjus­
tification effect (Lepper et al., 1973) and the decreased 
play effect (Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975), has indeed been demon­
strated in many laboratory and field experiments. 
The interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic motivational 
factors has received a great deal of attention for a number 
of reasons. Several investigators (e.g., Levine & Pasnacht, 
1974; Notz, 1975) have suggested that extrinsic rewards may 
undermine instrinsic motivation, produce superficial learn­
ing, and adversely affect the quality of performance. 
Condry (1977) proposes that external inducements can have 
deleterious effects on exploratory behavior in general. 
The overjustification effect also has implications for 
some broader theoretical issues in social psychology. The 
use of intrinsic motivation as a conceptual variable reflects 
current dissatisfaction with theories that attempt to explain 
human motivation as being directly related to biological need 
reduction (e.g., Deci, 1975: Hunt, 1965; Kelly, 1955; 
White, 1959). Overjustification research also attempts to 
address the relationship between attributional processes and 
noncognitive behavior. Finally, some psychologists believe 
that an understanding of intrinsic motivation will help in 
the study of creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1979; McGraw, 1978). 
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the 
interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors. 
The focus is on the attempt to construct a theoretical under­
standing of the psychological processes involved, rather than 
the implications for the therapeutic use of learning princi­
ples with human populations. (For discussions of the impli­
cations of intrinsic motivation for applied problems, see 
Arkes, 1978; Deci & Ryan, 1980; Ford & Foster, 1976; Levine 
& Fasnacht, 1974; Notz, 1975; Fuoco, Note 3). 
The present paper is organized as follows: First, the 
overjustification paradigm is discussed. Then the theoret­
ical approaches to overjustification are briefly reviewed. 
The theoretical review is followed by a comprehensive empir­
ical review. After a brief subjective discussion of the 
state of the art, a series of original investigations is 
presented. 
The Overjustification Effect 
The overjustification effect is defined as a reduction 
in intrinsic motivation following task performance under 
extrinsic conditions that demand performance. Intrinsic 
motivation has been operationally defined in terms of per­
formance in a free choice situation or as verbal preference 
ratings for the target activity. Performance measures 
include the following: (1) proportion of free time spent 
on the target activity, (2) number of units of the target 
activity completed during the free-choice session, and 
(3) whether the target activity is selected first during 
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free choice assessment. Verbal measures include (1) rat­
ings of the target activity on affectively-toned semantic 
differential items, (2) Likert scale ratings of "liking" 
for the target activity, and (3) subjects' reported willingness 
to volunteer for unpaid task performance. Since there is no 
consensus among researchers that all of these types of 
measures provide equally valid indices of intrinsic motiva­
tion (e.g., Arnold, 1976), the use of verbal or performance 
measures is specified in this review. 
One of the earliest demonstrations of overjustification 
was reported by Deci (1971). Adult subjects were given 
access to an interesting puzzle task during a three-session 
procedure. The first and third sessions were free choice 
situations. During the second session, subjects in the 
reward group were offered money for playing with the puzzles, 
while a control group was neither offered nor received any 
payment. Between-group comparisons indicated less time spent 
with the puzzle game in session three for the rewarded subjects 
relative to the controls. 
Deci's (1971) studies were marred by a number of methodolog­
ical flaws, including the use of inappropriate statistical 
tests, unusually liberal p-values, and possible between-groups 
differences during the initial baseline period (Calder & 
Staw, 1975a: Scott, 1976). Another major problem was the 
failure to report performance data from the second session. 
The offer of money may have increased responding so that the 
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reward group spent more time on the target activity as com­
pared with the control group. If this were the case, then 
the postreward performance decrement may have been due to 
fatigue or boredom. 
A more convincing demonstration of an overjustification 
effect was provided by Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973). 
Using a three-session procedure, school children were given 
the opportunity to perform a drawing task. Following the 
initial free-choice session, one group of children was offered 
an award for drawing during the second session. A second 
group was given an unanticipated reward at the end of the 
second session, while a control group was neither offered nor 
given any extrinsic reward. Postreward free-play assessment 
showed that the expected-reward group spent less time on the 
drawing task as compared with the unexpected-reward and the 
control conditions. The reward manipulations did not produce 
any significant differences among the groups in second-
session performance, so that fatigue and boredom were ruled 
out as explanations for the postreward decrement. 
These early experiments stimulated a great deal of 
research on the overjustification effect. That research is 
reviewed below following a brief description of the major 
theoretical analyses that have been used to explain overjus-
tification phenomena. 
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Theories of Overjustification 
Attributional Analyses 
Attribution theory is concerned with the ways in which 
people acquire knowledge, and how that knowledge affects sub­
sequent behavior. The central tenet of the attributional 
analysis of overjustification effects is that these effects 
are mediated by the individual's causal inferences. People 
observe their own behavior and the conditions under which 
that behavior occurs. This information is then used to form 
an hypothesis about the cause of the behavior, which in turn 
affects the motivation to perform. 
DeCharms (1968), along with others (e.g., Deci, 1975; 
Hunt, 1965r White, 1959) has been critical of psychology for 
overemphasizing the role of external and homeostatic factors 
in human motivation. Traditional motivational theories 
would lead one to believe that most significant human activ­
ities are performed in order to avoid pain or to reduce the 
intensity of aversive internal tension states. DeCharms 
argues that many activities, especially creative endeavors 
and play behaviors, are intrinsically motivated. 
The critical concept in DeCharms' analysis of intrinsic 
motivation is the basic human need for freedom of choice. 
Individuals perceive themselves in any given situation along 
an Origin-Pawn dimension. To the extent that salient external 
controlling factors are at a minimum, the individual sees 
himself as a free agent, an Origin of behavior. Salient 
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external controlling factors, such as reward contingencies, 
lead the person to see himself as a Pawn. As a general rule, 
the latter situation is aversive; a self-perception of lack 
of freedom induces the person to behave in such a way as to 
increase the feeling of free choice. When a previously free 
behavior is constrained by the imposition of an external 
reward contingency, the motivation to perform the rewarded 
activity decreases. 
Kelley (1967, 1973) has developed a model of the kinds 
of causal heuristics used in various situations. For the 
purposes of the present paper, three principles of causal 
attribution are particularly important. First, people are 
aware that any given event can have a number of potential 
causes, so that the attributional process involves a selec­
tion among possible causal factors. Second, people tend to 
assign causality to a single antecedent variable, as opposed 
to a more rigorous scientific analysis which might involve 
multiple antecedents and interactions among antecedents 
(L. Ross, 1977). Finally, Kelley's discounting principle is 
important in overjustification. The discounting principle 
states that any potential cause will be discounted to the 
extent that other plausible causal factors are available. 
Assuming the truth of these principles, an individual 
who is rewarded for performing some activity would experience 
the following psychological processes. The individual would 
wonder why he is performing, and he would answer that ques­
tion on the basis of available data. There would be at least 
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two possible explanations: (1) the behavior is intrinsically 
motivated ("I'm doing it because I enjoy it") or (2) the 
behavior is extrinsically motivated ("I'm doing it for the 
money."). A salient incentive would induce the actor to 
attribute his performance to external factors, so that the 
importance of intrinsic motivation is discounted. Any post-
reward decrements in performance or verbal preference for 
the target activity would be a reflection of the reduction 
in perceived intrinsic motivation. 
A similar prediction may be derived from self-perception 
theory (Bern, 1967, 1972). Self-perception theory is an 
attempt, originating out of a Skinnerian behaviorist tradi­
tion, to describe the formation of attitudes about oneself. 
According to Bern, beliefs about the self arise primarily 
from observations of public events, while private stimuli 
available only to the individual may play a minor role in 
self-perception. In many situations, then, both an outside 
observer and an actor should use the same kind of analysis 
and reach similar conclusions about the motivation behind 
the actor's behavior. We come to like those activities 
which we perform frequently in the absence of salient con­
straints, while our attitudes are less positive towards 
activities that tend to occur primarily under compelling 
external circumstances. 
It should be noted that self-perception theory deals 
with the formation of attributions about the self on the 
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basis of behavioral data, but the theory explicitly does 
not attempt to explain the noncognitive behavior: 
In attribution models generally—and in self-
perception theory in particular, cognitions or self-
attributions are the dependent variables. Instrumental 
behaviors, consummatory responses, and physiological 
responses (real or falsified) are among the variables 
which can serve as the independent or antecedent var­
iables, the stimuli from which self-attributions of 
beliefs, attitudes, or internal states can be partially 
inferred by the individual. Attribution models are 
thus very explicit about the direction of the causal 
arrow, and they remain mute about any phenomenon in 
which non-cognitive response classes play the dependent 
variable: as dependent variables, such response classes 
are extra-theoretical. . . . How do attributional models 
account for non-cognitive response classes? They don't! 
Self-perception can get us from the stimulus manipulation 
to the attribution. It cannot get us from the attribu­
tion to anything beyond that. (Bern, 1972, p. 47) 
Many investigators (e.g., Calder & Staw, 1975b) in the 
overjustification area have assumed, implicitly or explicitly, 
that the self-perceptions can and do mediate a variety of 
noncognitive response classes. Thus, self-perception theory 
has been used to account not only for attributional dependent 
variables, but for other dependent variables as well. 
Cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1975, 1976; Deci, 
Cascio, & Krusell, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1980) is a theory of 
human motivation that emphasizes intrinsic motivation and 
mediating cognitions. Intrinsic motivation is defined as the 
innate need to feel competent and self-determining. Intrinsic 
motivation plays an especially important role in play, explo­
ration, and the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. 
Deci and his colleagues suggest that there are two general 
\ 
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classes of intrinsically motivated behaviors, those that are 
directed towards seeking challenge and behaviors that serve 
to conquer challenge. Intrinsically motivated activities 
are controlled by the central nervous system; intrinsic 
motives "have no appreciable effect on non-nervous system 
tissues" (Deci, 1975, p. 132). Finally, intrinsic motivation 
serves both to energize and direct behavior. 
People are motivated by an awareness of potential sat­
isfaction (feelings of competence and self-determination). 
This awareness is associated with hypotheses concerning the 
probability that various behaviors will lead to satisfaction. 
The individual then chooses a course of action likely to 
lead to satisfaction. If the outcome falls short of some 
internal standard of competence and self-determination, then 
some secondary course is pursued. This "TOTE" (Test-Operate-
Test-Exit) sequence (Miller, Gallanter, & Pribram, 1960) is 
repeated until the outcome matches the internal standard of 
satisfaction, or until the individual gives up and seeks 
satisfaction in entirely different situations. 
Deci (1975) points out that people need not be aware of 
the "awarenesses" that motivate behavior. Thus, there is no 
reason to expect that self-report measures would accurately 
reflect the interplay between cognitions and performance. 
External reward procedures initiate two opponent processes 
with respect to intrinsic motivation. The controlling aspect 
of reward provides feedback about self-determination. 
12 
Salient external rewards lead to a perception of an external 
locus of causality, which is associated with a reduction in 
feelings of self-determination. The informational aspect of 
reward provides the individual with feedback concerning 
competence with respect to the rewarded activity. The 
effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation depend upon the 
relative strengths of the two aspects of reward. If the 
controlling aspect is the more salient component, then per­
ceived intrinsic motivation declines, and a postreward per­
formance decrement should occur. If the informational aspect 
outweighs the controlling aspect, then perceived intrinsic 
motivation increases, and the residual effect of reward 
should be an increment in free-play performance. Thus 
rewards can serve to either increase, decrease, or have no 
effect on postreward performance. 
It should be noted that all of the attributional approaches 
to overjustification discussed above involved the concept of 
discounting. Salient external demands (incentives, audience, 
etc.) lead to a discounting of intrinsic motivation. This 
reduction in intrinsic motivation then produces postreward 
performance and verbal preference decrements. 
The Competing Response Hypothesis 
Reiss and Sushinsky (1975, 1976) have proposed an altern­
ative explanation of the overjustification effect. According 
to the competing response hypothesis, an extrinsic reward 
13 
may elicit responses that are incompatible with the perform­
ance of the target activity. A salient incentive may induce 
any of the following reactions: selective attention directed 
towards the reward rather than towards the task7 cognitions 
focused on the reward which may interfere with task perform­
ance; attention directed towards the person dispensing reward? 
an increase in general arousal. Any of these responses may 
interfere with performance quality and task enjoyment, so 
that the rewarded subject has less opportunity to learn to 
enjoy the target activity. The overjustification effect is 
thus a manifestation of the reduced quality of performance 
during the contingency session. 
The competing-response hypothesis makes several predic­
tions concerning the conditions that should strengthen or 
attenuate the overjustification effect. First, the overjus­
tification effect should be attenuated when multiple rewards 
trials are used as compared with a single reward trial pro­
cedure. This prediction is based on the assumption that 
repeated presentations of the reward will result in habitua­
tion of the competing responses. Second, the overjustifica­
tion effect should be most likely to occur when the reward 
procedure does not produce reinforcement effects, since rein­
forcement would indicate that the reward procedure has not 
disrupted performance. 
A more specific account of the competing response hypoth­
esis is the delay of gratification hypothesis (Ross, Karniol, 
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& Rothstein, 1976). According to this analysis, anticipating 
a reward produces frustration, especially in young children. 
Because the frustration is associated with the target activ­
ity, that activity acquires aversive properties. One predic­
tion derived from this analysis is that overjustification 
effects will occur independently of the specific nature of 
the reward contingency, since the anticipation of reward 
contiguous with the performance of the target activity is 
the only necessary condition. 
Williams ' Two-factor Model 
Williams (1980) proposed that any reward procedure has 
both excitatory and inhibitory components with respect to 
the target activity."'' The excitatory component is termed 
"reward value." Reward value can be assessed by the magni­
tude of the reinforcement effects produced within the 
overjustification experiment or by transituational pref­
erence measures. The inhibitory aspect of reward is "behav­
ior constraint." 
Behavior constraint increases with the extent to which 
a request to perform specifies performance required in 
order to obtain the reward and with the degree of per­
ceived threat of consequences for non-compliance. 
Behavior constraint decreases with the extent to which 
the subject can choose hir or her behavior during the 
contingency period and with the increased perception of 
freedom of choice concerning whether to participate in 
the contingency. (Williams, 1980, p. 602) 
The net residual effect of a reward procedure depends 
on the relative strengths of behavior constraint and reward 
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value. If behavior constraint is the more heavily weighted 
component, an overjustification effect should occur. Con­
versely, a post-reward increment in performance should occur 
when the reward value component is stronger than the behavior 
constraint component. One prediction derived from the 
2-factor model is that the magnitude of reinforcement effects 
during the contingency period should be inversely related 
to the magnitude of post-reward performance decrements 
(Williams, 1980). 
The 2-factor model is similar to Deci's cognitive 
evaluation theory in that both analyses propose inhibitory 
and excitatory components in extrinsic rewrrd procedures. 
There are two important differences. First, the two-factor 
model does not provide any conceptual definition of intrinsic 
motivation; rather, intrinsic motivation is a description of 
the probabilitty of behavior in a free-choice situation. 
Second, Williams (1980) argues that the controlling properties 
of reward do not cause overjustification effects, since con­
trol is demonstrated by reinforcement or incentive effects, 
which are inversely related to overjustification effects. 
Behavioral and Incentive Contrast 
Several investigators (e.g., Feingold & Mahoney, 1975: 
Fuoco, Note 3; Mawhinney, 1979) have noted that the overjus­
tification paradigm is in some ways similar to the successive 
behavioral/incentive contrast procedures used in animal 
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2 learning studies. These investigators have suggested 
that overjustification effects may best be understood as a 
subset of behavioral contrast effects, and that the integra­
tion of the two literatures may prove helpful. 
Mawhinney (1979) suggests that an operant analysis of 
reinforcement can be used to explain overjustification phe­
nomena. Dunham (1977) has proposed an optimal duration theory 
of reinforcement which predicts systematic transitory 
postreward effects. Optimal duration theory is an extension 
and modification of Premack's (1971) analysis of reinforce­
ment and punishment. According to Premack, the value of an 
activity for a given organism can be estimated from the dura­
tion of that activity in a free-choice situation. Higher 
valued activities should serve as reinforcers for lower valued 
activities, while lower valued activities should function 
as punishers for more highly valued behaviors. 
Dunham (1977) modified Premack's analysis by suggesting 
a more molecular analysis of value. Value, according to Dunham, 
is a function of both the optimal duration of an activity and 
the optimal inter-bout interval in an unconstrained situation. 
Sexual activity, for example, is valuable to the extent that 
the individual is allowed sufficient time to complete the 
act. Similarly, the value of sexual activity should decline 
if the organism is forced to continue participation past the 
optimal duration. The activity is valued to the extent that 
freedom to perform at the appropriate intervals is available. 
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Reinforcement, according to Dunham, contains an inhibi­
tory component in that it disrupts the optimal durations 
and/or intervals of the target activity. When a behavior is 
effectively reinforced, the organism is constrained to 
perform either for a duration that is longer than optimal, 
or at less than optimal intervals, or both. When the contin­
gency is removed, and the contingency change is discriminable, 
the organism will compensate for the constraint induced by 
previous reinforcement. If reinforcement produced durations 
longer than the optimal duration, the transitory residual 
effect will be durations of less than optimal. Similarly, 
constraining the organism towards shorter inter-bout inter­
vals results in compensatory intervals that are greater than 
optimal. 
The optimal duration analysis suggests that the occur­
rence of overjustification effects is directly related to 
the degree of disruption produced by the reward contingency. 
There should be a direct relationship between the magnitude 
of reinforcement and the magnitude of overjustification 
effects. Also, the duration of overjustification phenomena 
should be directly related to the duration of the contingency. 
Finally, overjustification effects should not occur for behav­
iors of maximum or near maximum initial value, if those 
behaviors occur at such a high frequency that they cannot 
be reinforced (Mawhinney, 1979). 
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The optimal duration analysis also suggests some meth­
odological procedures for the study of overjustification phe­
nomena. Since no a priori predictions of the nature of 
reinforcers are made, single-subject designs with sufficiently 
long pretreatment baselines provide the most appropriate 
test of the model. 
Reactance Theory 
Ransen (1980) has suggested that reactance theory may 
be useful in understanding overjustification effects. 
Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Wicklund, 1974; Wortman & 
Brehm, 1975) states that eliminating or threatening to con­
strain the availability of some previously free behavior will 
lead to attempts to reinstate that behavior. These attempts 
at reinstatement are manifest in increased reported pref­
erence or increased performance of the threatened activity. 
Reactance effects increase in magnitude as a direct function 
of (1) the initial value of the threatened activity, (2) the 
severity of the threat, and (3) the number of free behaviors 
that are threatened or eliminated. Reactance effects should 
occur whether the source of the threat is intentional or 
accidental, social or nonsocial. 
Two assumptions are necessary in order to apply reactance 
theory to an analysis of overjustification effects. First, 
it must be the case that external constraints such as 
rewards pose a threat (or perceived threat) to the free 
engagement of some set of unrewarded activities. Second, 
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the decrements in intrinsic motivation for the target activ­
ity following an external constraint procedure actually rep­
resent excitatory effects on that set of unrewarded activi­
ties. 
Wortman and Brehm (1975) have recently attempted to 
integrate reactance theory and learned helplessness theory 
(Seligman, 1975). It is argued that the probability of 
reactance effects diminishes rapidly as the subjective prob­
ability of reinstating the threatened behavior approaches zero. 
Initial instances of threat, then, should lead to an increase 
in the value of the threatened activity. If the threat con­
tinues , the probability of reinstatement diminishes, and the 
threatened activity is devalued. This approach would predict 
that overjustification effects would be unlikely following 
extended periods of external constraint, as might be the 
case in several multiple-reward sessions. 
Personal Equity Theory 
Personal equity theory (Seta & Seta, 1982) is an eco­
nomic model based in part on social equity theory (Adams, 
1965). According to personal equity theory, an individual's 
rewards and costs in a given situation are evaluated through 
an intrapersonal comparator process. The theory assumes 
that, for a particular target activity, there exists a range 
of cost or reward that corresponds to the value of the activ­
ity. For a low-valued activity, an individual might expect 
that he or she should receive a certain range of reward for 
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performing the activity. Similarly, the individual has some 
expectation that a range of cost should be incurred in order 
to participate in a highly valued activity. 
Personal equity theory suggests that the outcomes of 
various overjustification procedures can be analyzed in 
terms of the ranges of value associated with both the target 
activity and the incentive. Consider a situation in which 
an attractive incentive is offered for a boring or low-value 
task. Assuming that the incentive value is greater than the 
range of value associated with the task, the subject is 
receiving a communication that the experimenter considers 
the task to be valuable. Under these circumstances the 
subject's value of the activity may increase towards the 
experimenter's implicit value. However, increasing the 
incentive value even further may lead the subject to expect 
that the activity, especially if it is a novel activity, is 
more valuable than it can possibly be. Subsequent perform­
ance would violate this unrealistic expectation, leading to 
a devaluation of the activity. 
In a similar fashion, both increments and decrements in 
the value of an interesting target activity would be pre­
dicted from personal equity theory. Minimal rewards should 
lead to devaluation of an high-value target activity, while 
much larger rewards should produce value increments. 
For the purposes of the present paper, the following 
points should be made concerning personal equity processes 
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in an overjustification procedure. First, we should expect 
interactions between the magnitude of reward and the initial 
value of the target activity. Second, the effects of dif­
ferent reward magnitudes on subsequent target activity value 
should produce nonlinear functions. Third, to the extent 
that incentive procedures constitute a violation of freedom 
of choice, this would input into the comparator process as a 
cost factor. 
A final point about personal equity theory concerns the 
operation of the comparator system itself. Seta and Seta 
have shown that by making certain input variables more or 
less salient, value shifts occur as if the salience manipula­
tions have produced different weightings for the factors. It 
may also be the case that aspects of the situation may trigger 
the operation of the comparator system itself. In the typical 
overjustification study, subjects are offered some reward 
for doing a particular activity. This may comprise an invi­
tation for the subjects to engage in task-reward comparisons. 
Such comparisons are less likely to occur in the standard 
control conditions, in which there is no mention of any 
reward. An intrapersonal economic analysis may be less 
likely to occur in the latter situation. In other words, 
the typical oversufficient justification procedure may be 
evoking two independent operations: (1) it increases the 
likelihood that the subject makes economic comparisons, 
and (2) it provides a particular reward input for the com­
parison. 
\ 
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Literature Review 
Salience 
According to the attributional analysis of the overjus-
tification effect, reductions in intrinsic motivation are 
most likely to occur when the reward is made very salient. 
Salience should increase attention to the reward, which would 
then increase the probability of attributing performance to 
the reward. M. Ross (1975) manipulated salience in two 
different ways. In the first experiment, the reward was 
either present or absent during the contingency period. 
During the free play assessment period, performance of the 
target activity was significantly reduced in the reward-present 
group, relative to the reward-absent group and an unrewarded 
control group. There were no significant differences in 
postreward performance for the reward-absent and the control 
conditions. In Experiment 2, Ross manipulated reward salience 
by instructions. A think-reward group of children were told 
to concentrate on the reward during the contingency period. 
Children in the nonideation group were simply promised a 
reward. In a distraction condition, subjects were instructed 
to think about an irrelevant event (a recent snowfall) during 
the reward session. Finally, an unrewarded control group was 
included in the design. Postreward performance scores indi­
cated a reduction in intrinsic interest for the think-reward 
and nonideation conditions relative to the control condi­
tion. Performance in the control and distraction conditions 
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did not significantly differ. These results provide partial 
support for the salience hypothesis. Ross suggests that the 
lack of differences between the think-reward and non-ideation 
may have occurred because the non-ideation children tended 
to concentrate on the reward although they were not explicitly 
told to do so. The distraction instructions apparently 
reduced concentration on the reward so that an overjustifica­
tion effect did not occur. 
Lepperetal. (1973) manipulated salience by using either 
unexpected or expected rewards. Post-reward performance 
scores indicated a reduction in intrinsic motivation only 
for the expected-reward condition. This effect has been 
replicated in other experiments (Lepper & Greene, 1975r 
Greene & Lepper, 1974: W. E. Smith, 1974). 
Reiss and Sushinsky (1975; Experiment 1) used a 2 x 2 
factorial design to investigate the effects of reward salience. 
Half of the subjects received expected reward, while half 
received unexpected reward. Within these conditions, half 
of the subjects were exposed to the reward at the beginning 
of the contingency session, while the remainder of the 
subjects were not exposed to the reward. Analysis of post-
reward performance scores indicated a significant main 
effect for expectations, with reduced performance in the 
expected reward relative to the unexpected reward condition. 
The main effect for exposure and the interaction were not 
significant. The fact that mere exposure did not reduce 
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postreward performance is important. This finding suggests 
that the reward stimulus must be presented as a reward in 
order for performance-reward instrumentality to be enhanced. 
Kruglanski, Riter, Amitai, Margolin, Shabtai, and 
Zaksh (1975) examined salience in terms of whether external 
reward is typically an integral part of the target activity. 
For some "money-intrinsic" tasks, such as penny-pitching, 
monetary reward is typically associated with the activity. 
For "money-extrinsic" tasks, monetary payment is unusual 
(salient). In two conceptual replications, Kruglanski et al. 
crossed money-intrinsic task vs. money-extrinsic task with 
reward vs. no reward. Postreward preference ratings indicate 
that payment reduced intrinsic interest in the "money-extrin-
sic" tasks, while payment increased preference for the "money-
intrinsic" tasks. Interpretation of these data are difficult. 
First, Kruglanski et al. provide no satisfactory explanation 
as to why reward should increase intrinsic motivation in the 
"money-intrinsic" tasks (Deci & Ryan, 1980). Second, the 
two studies contain a conceptual confound. The data indicate 
that the "money-intrinsic" and "money-extrinsic" tasks differ 
in initial value, with the "money-intrinsic" being less 
valued. Thus the results can be interpreted as demonstrat­
ing that rewards enhance intrinsic motivation for boring 
tasks and undermine intrinsic motivation for interesting 
activities. 
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In general, the literature indicates that rewards are 
most likely to reduce intrinsic motivation when the reward 
is highly salient. It should be noted that other independent 
variables (e.g., reward magnitude) might be interpreted as 
salience manipulations; these factors are treated in separate 
sections. 
Initial Interest in the Target Activity 
Since research in the overjustification area is concerned 
with changes in intrinsic motivation, most studies have used 
tasks that are either demonstrated or assumed to be highly 
interesting for the subject population. A few experiments, 
however, have systematically varied the initial value of the 
task. Calder and Staw (1975) had adult male subjects perform 
either an interesting puzzle task, with unclad women, or a 
boring task (blank puzzles). Post-reward verbal preference 
measures indicated that monetary reward decreased intrinsic 
motivation for the interesting task, while reward increased 
preference for the boring task. This interaction has been 
replicated by a number of investigators, using post-reward 
performance as an index of intrinsic motivation (Lee, Syrnyk, 
& Hallschmid, 1977; McLoyd, 1979; Loveland & Olley, 1979; 
Carstens, Beck, & Reavis, 1982, Note 1. The Carstens et al. 
study also found that reward had no effect on target activ­
ities of intermediate initial value. 
26 
Three studies have provided partial replication of 
the results of Calder and Staw (1975). Danner and Lonky 
(1981) and Upton (1973) found that reward decreased intrinsic 
motivation for an interesting activity, while no change 
occurred when a less interesting activity was rewarded. 
Hamner and Foster (1975) found an increase in intrinsic 
motivation when a boring task was rewarded, while reward had 
no effect or intrinsic motivation for an interesting task. 
If one assumes that the tasks in which no effect occurred 
were of intermediate value, then the results of the three 
studies described above are consistent with the Calder and 
Staw (1975) data. 
One published report has yielded data that are inconsis­
tent with the rest of the literature on the interaction of 
extrinsic reward and initial value. Greene, Sternberg, and 
Lepper (1976) designed a classroom token economy system in 
which children were rewarded for performing various mathe­
matics activities. Children were assigned to either high or 
low initial interest groups according to individual baseline 
performance. Following the termination of the token economy, 
between-groups performance measures indicated a decrease in 
intrinsic motivation for the low-value group and no overjus-
tification effect for the high-value group. Although the 
Greene et al. study differed methodologically from the 
previously reported studies, including the use of multiple 
\ 
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rewards and assessment sessions over several weeks, the 
reason for the discrepant data is not clear. 
With the exception of the Greene et al. (1976) study, 
the research indicates that reward increases intrinsic moti­
vation for dull activities, decreases intrinsic motivation 
for interesting tasks, and has little effect on tasks of 
intermediate value. Given the consistency of the research 
findings, it is somewhat surprising that little attempt has 
been made to explain the interaction of extrinsic reward and 
task value within an attributional framework. Calder and 
Staw (1975) argue that the interaction follows from self-
perception theory, although they do not present the derivation. 
In fact, self-perception theory would lead to the prediction 
that reported preference for a highly interesting activity 
would decrease following reward, and that the detrimental 
effects of reward would be attenuated for a boring activity 
to the extent that a floor effect occurs. It is not clear 
how self-perception theory would suggest an increase in 
reported value of a boring task following reward. Self-
perception theory makes no prediction about performance 
measures of intrinsic motivation (Bern, 1972). 
Deci and Ryan (1980) propose an alternative explanation 
for the interaction of reward and initial value. The decrease 
in intrinsic motivation for interesting activities is due to 
the effects of the controlling aspects of reward. The 
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increase in preference or performance for dull tasks does 
not represent an increase in intrinsic motivation, but 
rather an increase in task satisfaction. Deci and Ryan 
(1980) do not clearly differentiate the conceptual distinc­
tion between task satisfaction and intrinsic motivation, 
although the concepts apparently share common operational 
definitions. It would seem that changes in post-reward pref­
erence or performance that are explicable from cognitive 
evaluation theory represent changes in intrinsic motivation, 
while other post-reward effects are indices of task satisfac­
tion. 
Williams' (1980) 2-factor model provides a means of 
explaining the interaction between extrinsic reward and 
initial value. Two assumptions are necessary. First, let 
us assume that the constraining aspect of a given reward 
procedure is equivalent for both high- and low-value activi­
ties. Second, consider that the magnitude of the reward 
value component is a function of the relationship between the 
value of the target activity and the value of the reward. 
Given a common reward, the reward value increases as the 
initial value of the target activity decreases. Thus, for a 
highly interesting activity, the reward value component is 
outweighed by the constraining aspect of reward. The opposite 
is true for a target activity of low initial value. For 
target tasks of intermediate value, the magnitude of constraint 
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and reward value should be roughly equivalent, so that no 
net change in intrinsic motivation will occur. 
Finally, Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) have argued that 
the interaction of reward and initial value is consistent 
with the competing-response hypothesis. To the extent that 
reward distracts attention from an interesting task, interest 
in that task should increase. Conversely, a reward might 
enhance interest in a low-value activity by diverting atten­
tion from the activity's boring features. 
Enhancing and Attenuating External Attributions 
According to the attributional analysis of intrinsic 
motivation, one of two possible mediating conditions is 
necessary for the overjustification effect to occur: (1) the 
subject makes an external attribution during the contingency 
period, and this external attribution persists into post-
reward assessment to mediate performance/preference, or 
(2) some event occurs after the contingency period that 
induces a retrospective external attribution. Experiments 
by Carstens and Seta (Note 2) and Fazio (1981) investigated 
the characteristics of the post-reward performance session 
that would enhance or attenuate the persistence of the 
external attribution. Carstens and Seta argued that the per­
sistence of an external attribution should be affected by 
the potential for new information about the target activity 
in the test situation. If the test situation provides no 
new information about the previously rewarded task, the 
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external attribution should persist, and an overjustification 
effect should occur. If, however, the test situation pro­
vides new information about the target activity, the subject 
should re-engage in an attributional analysis, so that per­
formance is no longer mediated by the outdated external 
attribution. Carstens and Seta gave subjects either money 
or no reward for listening to a particular selection of clas­
sical music. For half of the subjects, the contingency and 
postreward sessions contained the same choices of classical 
music, while the nonrewarded tape differed across sessions 
for the remainder of the subjects. Time spent listening to 
classical music decreased following reward only when the 
test situation provided no new samples of classical music, 
thus supporting the predictions concerning the persistence 
of external attributions. 
Fazio (1981) manipulated the persistence of reward-
induced external attributions by introducing information that 
was inconsistent with the external attribution. Children 
were either rewarded or not rewarded for performing a drawing 
task. Just prior to the test session, half of the children 
were shown a photograph of themselves performing the target 
activity during a free-play baseline, i.e., under conditions 
of intrinsic motivation. An overjustification effect occurred 
only in the no-photograph reward condition. Presumably the 
photograph induced a reexamination of the external attribu­
tion formed during the contingency session. 
31 
Kruglanski, Alon, and Lewis (1972) demonstrated that 
an overjustification effect might be mediated by an external 
attribution that develops after the reward session. Chil­
dren were either rewarded or not rewarded for participating 
in a group activity. The reward group had not been led to 
expect any reward prior to participation in the target 
activity. When the reward was delivered, however, the chil­
dren were told that they had been promised reward earlier. 
Postreward preference measures indicated lower ratings for 
the target activity in the reward group vs. the no-reward 
group. In addition, there was a significantly greater ten­
dency for children in the reward condition to attribute their 
participation to the offer of incentive, even though this 
could not have been the case. 
Finally, two published studies (Dollinger, 1979: Pitt-
raann, Cooper, & Smith, 1977) attempted to manipulate causal 
attributions by the use of directive cues associated with 
the reward procedure. Dollinger (1979) gave children either 
an expected or unexpected reward for solving puzzles. Half 
of the subjects were told that they surely enjoyed the task 
as reward was delivered, while the remaining subjects were 
told that they surely must enjoy the reward. Post-reward 
performance measures yielded a Cue x Expectation interaction: 
the two expected-reward conditions did not differ, while 
intrinsic interest was higher for the task-cue cell relative 
to the reward-cue cell in the unexpected reward conditions. 
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Pittman et al. (1977) used a false physiological feedback 
procedure to affect causal attributions. Rewarded subjects 
were told, during the contingency session, that GSR readings 
indicated either interest in the task or in the reward. 
Another rewarded group received no false feedback, while a 
control group received neither reward nor feedback. Reward 
reduced postreward performance in all conditions, but the 
performance decrement was attenuated for the task-cue 
condition. 
Developmental Effects 
The attributional analyses of overjustification phe­
nomena demand the operation of certain cognitive capacities 
in the subject. First, the subject must be aware that there 
are multiple potential causes for any given effect. Second, 
the subject must use the discounting principle (Kelley, 
1973) to choose among potential causes. Attributional 
research has made it abundantly clear that adults use multi­
ple causal schemata and discounting. Young children, on the 
other hand, do not seem to make consistent use of discount­
ing, yet they behave very much like adults in overjustifica­
tion procedures (see Sedlak & Kurtz, 1981, for a review). 
Several experiments (e.g., Baldwin & Baldwin, 1970; 
Karniol & Ross, 1979: M. C. Smith, 1975) have shown that chil­
dren under 6 years of age tend to use an additive rather than 
a discounting strategy in social inference. M. C. Smith, 
for example, presented subjects with a story in which an 
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actor performs an activity either under an incentive condi­
tion or in an unconstrained situation. Fourth-graders and 
adults showed evidence of discounting by attributing greater 
intrinsic motivation to. the unconstrained actor. Kindergar­
ten children seemed to use an additive rule in attributing 
greater intrinsic motivation to the rewarded actor. Second-
graders were transitional, displaying a mixture of discount­
ing and additive causal attribution. 
Given the lack of evidence of the use of discounting in 
preschoolers, an attributional analysis would predict that 
overjustification effects would not occur with this popula­
tion. On the contrary, the use of an additive inference rule 
would suggest that prior reward should increase intrinsic 
motivation. Several experiments (e.g., Anderson, Manoogian, 
& Reznick, 1976; Dollinger & Thelen, 1978; Loveland & Olley, 
1979; M. Ross, 1975) have obtained overjustification effects 
with preschoolers. Morgan (1981) conducted two experiments 
to investigate the relationship between inferential schemata 
and overjustification effects. In Experiment I, children 
ranging in age from 5 to 11 years were each given an additive-
discounting test similar to the procedure used by M. C. Smith 
(1975). From this pretesting subjects were then classified 
as either additive, discounting, or transitional. Cognitive 
categorization was highly correlated with age, such that 
5-year-olds tended to be additive, 8-year-olds to be transi­
tional, and 11-year-olds to be discounting. All children 
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then participated in a standard overjustification experiment. 
At each cognitive stage, postreward performance decrements 
occurred, as compared with unrewarded controls. Experiment II 
was a replication in which all subjects were 8 years old. 
- Again, overjustification effects occurred at all three cogni­
tive stages. 
There are three potential explanations for the discrep­
ancy between attributional predictions and the absence of 
developmental effects in overjustification. First, it may 
be the case that nonattributional analyses provide a better 
explanation of overjustification effects. The merits of com­
peting hypotheses are discussed at length elsewhere in this 
paper. Second, self-perception processes may underlie adult 
overjustification effects, whereas other perhaps more "prim­
itive" processes may operate to produce overjustification 
effects in young children. Finally, it may be the case that 
the tests used to classify subjects into causal schemata 
categories may be poor indices of self-perception processes 
(Sedlak & Kurtz, 1981; Morgan, 1981). 
Sedlak and Kurtz (1981) have suggested that a problem _ 
with the methods of categorizing children into schemata 
groups may underlie the absence of a relationship between 
overjustification effects and causal schemata. Shultz and 
Butkowsky (1977) have shown that a given child can be clas­
sified as either additive or discounting depending upon the 
method of testing. Kindergarten children were presented with 
verbal accounts and videotaped sequences of social behavior. 
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The videotape presentation produced inferences consistent 
with discounting, while the verbal items produced a mixed 
additive-discounting analysis. Young children may be more 
likely to use more sophisticated causal heuristics when the 
data are more salient or meaningful, as might be the case in 
a self-perception analysis. 
Multiple Reward Procedures 
Researchers have been interested in investigating over-
justification effects following multiple reward procedures 
for two reasons. First, the competing response hypothesis 
(Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975, 1976) suggests that the probability 
of an overjustification effect should diminish as the number 
of reward trials increases. Recall that this hypothesis 
attributes postreward motivational decrements to the dis­
tracting effects of rewards during the contingency period. 
Assuming that the capacity of the incentive to elicit responses 
that are incompatible with task performance and enjoyment 
diminishes over repeated exposures, then multiple reward 
presentations should produce little or no overjustification 
effects. 
The second reason for interest in multiple reward pro­
cedures is the suggestion that applied token economy programs 
may have deleterious effects (e.g., Levine & Fasnacht, 1974). 
While there can be no doubt that token programs can influence 
behavior during the operation of the contingency, the justi­
fication for such programs is the maintenance of desired 
behavior patterns in the absence of a prosthetic environment. 
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Many behavior modifiers have noted that the withdrawal of 
tokens often results in a behavioral regression to pre-
treatment levels (see Kazdin & Bootzin, 1972, for a review). 
The failure of token economics to produce robust behavior 
change that generalizes across time and situations may be 
due to the undermining effects of rewards, or to the neglect 
of the behavior modifier to design the program so that 
intrinsic motivation will be enhanced. 
Smith and Pittmann (1978) designed a laboratory exper­
iment to test the predictions of the competing response 
hypothesis in a multiple reward trial situation. Adult sub­
jects performed a maze activity for 10, 25, or 50 experi­
mental trials. Rewarded subjects were paid on a trial basis. 
Distraction subjects received no reward, but heard a taped 
lecture during the maze task. Control subjects were neither 
distracted nor rewarded. Neither the reward nor distraction 
manipulations had a significant effect on experimental ses­
sion performance. Postexperimental, free-choice behavior 
indicated that intrinsic motivation was reduced for rewarded 
subjects relative to controls. Free-choice behavior did not 
differ for the distraction and control conditions. Finally, 
the number of experimental trials had no effect or subsequent 
intrinsic motivation. These data suggest that it is the 
anticipation of reward, rather than distraction, which under­
lies the overjustification effect. 
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E. Fisher (1979) and Fuoco (Note 3) investigated the 
effects of token reward on clinical populations of adult psy­
chiatric patients. Both studies used reversal designs with 
behavior assessed over a period of several weeks. Both 
studies used basic hygiene-housekeeping tasks as target 
activities. The tokens produced a reinforcement effect and 
a post-reward overjustification effect in both investiga­
tions. In the Fuoco (Note 3) study, the overjustification 
effect was eliminated by pairing the tokens with praise. 
Greene et al. (1976) also found that overjustification 
effects can occur in token economies. Children were rewarded 
either for specific math activities, or they were non-
differentially rewarded for participating in any experimental 
activities. Post-reward free-play performance scores indi­
cated a reduction in intrinsic motivation for children who 
were differentially rewarded either for low initial value 
activities or for their choice of' target activities. No 
overjustification effect occurred for the high-value activ­
ities. 
Several other token reward programs have failed to yield 
overjustification effects (Davidson & Bucher, 1978; Feingold 
& Mahoney, 1975: Mynatt, Oakley, Arrkelin, Piccione, Margolis, 
& Arrkelin, 1978). In each of these studies, children 
received multiple rewards over a period of several days. 
The rewards produced significant reinforcement effects in 
each case. In the Feingold and Mahoney (1975) and Davidson 
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and Bucher (1978) studies, the reinforcement effect was main­
tained after the withdrawal of rewards. 
The research on token economies indicates that overjus-
tification effects can occur with multiple reward procedures. 
The conditions that are necessary for an undermining of 
intrinsic motivation have not yet been satisfactorily identi­
fied. The sparseness and ambiguity of the research findings 
certainly do not justify the abandonment of applied multiple 
reward procedures. This is especially true in light of the 
fact that token economies often employ procedures that should 
minimize overjustification effects, such as (1) the selection 
of low initial value activities as target tasks, (2) avoid­
ance of abrupt withdrawal of reward, and (3) attempts to use 
social and naturally occurring rewards rather than artificial 
or arbitrary rewards. 
Reinforcement and Incentive Effects 
The presence or absence of a reinforcement or incentive 
effect during the contingency period is an important variable 
in the overjustification effect according to a number of 
theoretical approaches. According to the attributional anal­
yses, reductions in intrinsic motivation are mediated by 
the perception that the' reward procedure is controlling per­
formance of the target activity. It follows, then', that 
perceptions of external causality will be most likely to 
occur when the reward procedure does indeed have a controlling 
effect. An attributional approach could thus predict a 
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direct relationship between reinforcement/incentive effects 
during the contingency period and overjustification effects 
during postreward assessment. Nonetheless, some attribu-
tional theorists (e.g., Deci, 1975; Lepper & Greene, 1976) 
have argued that prior reinforcement/incentive effects are 
not critical to the occurrence of overjustification effects. 
This latter position is also consistent with a general attri-
butional framework: if the external conditions are very 
salient, self-attributions may be based almost entirely on 
those external conditions, with self-perception of behavior 
per se providing very little input (Bern, 1972). Thus, rein­
forcement/incentive effects may or may not be critical determ­
inants of mediating attributions, depending on the salience 
of the external potential causal factors, 
Williams' (1980) 2-factor model proposes that reward 
procedures have both an excitatory and an inhibitory component. 
The excitatory component is reward value, which is inferred 
from the magnitude of reinforcement effects. The probability 
of an overjustification effect is directly related to the 
strength of the inhibitory component and inversely related 
to the amount of reward value. Thus the two-factor model 
and the attributional analyses make opposite predictions 
concerning reinforcement effects and overjustification effects. 
The competing-response hypothesis (Reiss & Sushinsky, 
1975, 1976) also predicts an inverse relationship between 
\ 
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prior reinforcement and postreward performance. According 
to this analysis, rewards can elicit a variety of cognitions 
and noncognitive behaviors which are incompatible with a 
full enjoyment of the target activity. The overjustification 
effect reflects the distracted contingency period performance 
of rewarded subjects. A reinforcement effect during the 
contingency session should mean that the incentive is not 
interfering with performance, so that an overjustification 
effect is unlikely. 
Finally, reinforcement/incentive effects are critical 
to behavioral contrast analyses of overjustification (e.g., 
Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Mawhinney, 1979; Fuoco, Note 3). 
Behavioral contrast notions would predict a direct relation­
ship between reinforcement/incentive effects during the 
contingency period and postcontingency overjustification 
effects. 
Table 1 represents a summary of the available data on 
the relationship between reinforcement/incentive effects. 
The summary would suggest that reinforcement/incentive effects 
are neither necessary nor sufficient antecedents of overjus­
tification effects. This proposition should be made with 
some caution, however, because the overjustification litera­
ture is not characterized by systematic attempts to investi­
gate reinforcement/incentive effects. This neglect is 
illustrated by the following points: 
(1) Many studies contain no reports of contingency 
session performance. 
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(2) Many studies have only verbal measures of intrinsic 
motivation, which may be less sensitive than performance 
measures in terms of identifying reinforcement relationships. 
(3) Most experiments use between-subjects comparisons, 
as opposed to the typical operant investigation in which 
reinforcement variables are examined using within-subject 
designs. 
(4) Most of the overjustification experiments use single-
reward procedures and a brief (e.g., 10-min) contingency 
session, in contrast to the multiple-reward, multiple session 
designs used in the operant analysis of reinforcement. 
(5) Few overjustification studies have included precise 
pre-experimental measures of individual reward-activity value 
relationships. 
(6) Very few overjustification studies have systematically 
varied the magnitude of reward across several levels, while 
keeping the qualitative nature of the reward constant. 
Reward Magnitude 
Surprisingly few published studies have manipulated 
several different levels of reward magnitude while keeping 
the qualitative nature of the rewards constant. The attri-
butional and competing-response analyses would predict a 
direct relationship between magnitude of reward and magnitude 
of overjustification effects. A behavioral contrast approach 
would also predict a direct relationship, if there is a 
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direct relationship between reward magnitude and the magni­
tude of reinforcement/incentive effects. Williams' (1980) 
2-factor model, on the other hand, would suggest an inverse 
relationship between reward magnitude and overjustification 
effects. This prediction is based on the assumption that the 
behavior constraint component of reward remains constant as 
the reward value component increases. It would be just as 
reasonable to assume that both reward value and behavior 
constraint increase as a function of increasing reward mag­
nitude, especially if the higher levels of reward have a 
stronger reinforcing (constraining) effect. 
Williams' (1980) found an inverse relationship between 
the value of a reward and the occurrence of overjustification 
effects. Children were rewarded for task performance with 
either highly valued or less valued comic books. The highly 
valued comic book produced a significant incentive effect, 
while the low-valued reward did not. Subsequent performance 
measures indicated that an overjustification effect, relative 
to unrewarded controls, occurred only in the low-valued 
reward condition. E. Fisher (1979) found evidence of a 
direct relationship between reward magnitude and the occur­
rence of overjustification effects. In a within-subjects 
reversal design, institutionalized patients performed self-
care skills for one token, five tokens, or no payment. Both 
token procedures produced a significant reinforcement effect, 
with the five-token procedure having a greater reinforcement 
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effect than the one-token procedure. No-token sessions that 
were immediately preceded by five-token sessions produced 
significantly less target activity as compared with no-token 
sessions that were immediately preceded by one-token sessions. 
Finally Farr et al. (1977) found no relationship between 
three levels of monetary payment and subsequent performance 
and verbal measures of intrinsic interest, nor were the 
different payment levels associated with different perform­
ance levels during the contingency session. 
The conflicting results and the dearth of evidence 
allow no conclusions as to the relationship between reward 
magnitude and residual intrinsic interest. This is unfor­
tunate, since the variable is important in both.theoretical 
and applied terms. 
Reward Contingency 
Several overjustification studies have examined the spe­
cific way in which the reward contingency is described to the 
4 subject. There are two reasons why this variable is consid­
ered to be important. Deci (1972) suggested that the con­
trolling aspect of reward should vary according to the reward 
contingency. In piece-rate and minimum performance criterion 
pay schedules, the reward is directly tied to performance. 
These payment schedules emphasize the instrumentality of the 
target activity,, so that a maximum reduction in intrinsic 
motivation should occur. If rewards are contingent only on 
participation in the target activity, however, the subjects 
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are less likely to make external attributions, and the over-
justification effect should be attenuated. 
Reward contingency is also an important variable within 
the context of the delay of gratification hypothesis (Ross 
et al., 1976). This hypothesis states that a delay between 
the promise and the delivery of reward can be frustrating, 
especially to young children. Through association, this 
frustration can make the target activity aversive. In addi­
tion, the frustration state may be accompanied by behaviors 
and cognitions that are incompatible with performance of 
the target task (Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975, 1976). The delay 
of gratification hypothesis would predict, then, that the 
precise nature-of the contingency is not a critical variable 
in undermining intrinsic motivation. 
Several studies have found that the nature of the con­
tingency does have an effect on intrinsic motivation. Ross 
et al. (1976) compared the effects of a wait contingency with 
a participation contingency on post-reward target activity 
performance. They found that the participation contingency 
produced an undermining effect relative to an unrewarded 
control group, while the wait contingency did not produce 
an overjustification effect. Similarly, Swann and Pittmann 
(1977) found that postreward free-play was reduced by a 
participation contingency but not by a wait contingency. 
Pinder (1976) demonstrated that adult subjects who had experi­
enced a piece-rate reward schedule were less likely to 
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freely engage in an interesting target activity relative to 
subjects who had been rewarded for participation in the 
task. The piece-rate schedule also produced lower prefer­
ence ratings for the target task as compared with the par­
ticipation schedule. Finally, the piece-rate subjects were 
more likely than the participation subjects to attribute their 
motivation to the reward. 
Harackiewicz (1979) compared the residual effects of a 
minimal criterion contingency with a participation contin­
gency. Both payment schedules reduced intrinsic motivation, 
but the reduction was significantly greater for the criterion 
contingency schedule. Harackiewicz measured intrinsic moti­
vation with a statistical combination of both verbal and per­
formance measures. C. Fisher (1978) found that a piece-rate 
schedule resulted in a greater tendency toward external 
attributions relative to a participation contingency, but 
the two conditions did not differ significantly in verbal 
measures of intrinsic motivation. Farr, Vance, and Mclntyre 
(1977) found that piece-rate schedules reduced postreward 
free-play performance as compared with a participation con­
tingency. Piece-rate treatment led to higher intrinsic 
motivation than did participation payment, however, on verbal 
measures of intrinsic motivation. Piece-rate payment resulted 
in more external attributions of causality than did the par­
ticipation contingency. 
While the studies cited above tend to support the 
notion that piece-rate and criterion contingencies are more 
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detrimental to intrinsic motivation than participation con­
tingencies, other experiments find no effect for reward con­
tingency. Farr (1976) found no differences in either post-
reward performance or Verbal measures between piece-rate and 
participation schedules. Weiner and Mander (1978) found that 
reward reduced free-play performance relative to unrewarded 
controls, but the undermining effect was the same for par-
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ticipation and piece-rate schedules. Hamner and Foster 
(1975) found no differences in verbal measures of intrinsic 
motivation when comparing participation, piece-rate, and 
no-payment conditions. 
Enzle and Ross (1978) obtained results that were directly 
opposite of the predictions derived from cognitive evaluation 
theory. Higher levels of payment reduced verbal measures of 
intrinsic interest in participation contingencies, while high 
payment increased intrinsic motivation in criterion contin­
gencies. Karniol and Ross (1977) also found that a reduction 
in postreward play with the target activity occurred fol­
lowing a participation contingency but not with a criterion 
contingency. 
Rosenfield, Folger, and Adelman (1980) suggested that 
the ambiguous results described above may be due to the fact 
that the contingency per se is not a critical variable in 
the overjustification effect. Rosenfield et al. referred to 
Deci's analysis which states that the controling aspect of 
reward decreases intrinsic motivation and the informational 
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aspect may increase intrinsic motivation. All salient 
reward contingencies will probably be perceived as controlling 
behavior. The specific nature of the contingency does not, 
however, allow precise predictions concerning the amount of 
competency information that the subject infers. In the case 
of a participation or wait contingency, each subject must 
determine the level of competence achieved on the basis of a 
very limited amount of information. Similarly, criterion or 
piece-rate payment doesn't necessarily imply excellent or 
outstanding performance. Rosenfield et al. suggest that 
only when specific competency feedback is provided to the 
subject can a precise prediction be made concerning the 
strength of the enhancing effect of reward. Rosenfield et al. 
tested this hypothesis by crossing three payment levels with 
high and low competency feedback and participation versus 
piece-rate contingencies. They found that when rewards 
reflected a high degree of skill, intrinsic motivation, 
assessed by verbal and performance measures, was enhanced. 
Conversely, rewards associated with low competence under­
mined intrinsic motivation. These effects occurred regard­
less of whether a participation or a piece-rate contingency 
was used. 
Verbal Rewards and Competence 
According to cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1975: 
Deci & Ryan, 1980)/ any reward procedure has both controlling 
and informational aspects. To the extent that the controlling 
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aspect is salient, the reward procedure will decrease percep­
tions of self-determination and intrinsic motivation. If 
the information provided by rewards leads the person to see 
himself as competent at performing the target activity, 
intrinsic motivation will increase. Thus rewards may either 
increase or decrease intrinsic motivation, depending upon 
the relative salience of the two aspects of reward. Deci 
and his associates have argued that when praise is used as a 
reward, the informational component tends to outweigh the 
controlling component. Praise is more likely to be perceived 
as an index of increasing competence and less likely to be 
seen as an explicit attempt at control, as compared with 
tangible rewards. 
Deci (1972) tested his hypothesis using a 3 x 2 design 
in which three levels of monetary payment (no money, immediate 
payment, and delayed payment) were crossed with two levels 
of praise (praise vs. no praise). Only the monetary payment 
variable had a significant effect on postreward free-play 
performance times. The praise variable produced no signifi­
cant effects either as a main effect or in interaction with 
monetary payment. 
Anderson, Manoogian, and Reznick (1976) compared the 
effects of praise and "good player" awards with children as 
subjects. Postreward performance measures indicated that 
intrinsic motivation decreased following the awards and 
increased following praise. 
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Fuoco (Note 3) investigated the residual effects of 
rewards in a token economy with institutionalized mentally 
retarded adults. During the reward phase, subjects received 
either praise, tokens, or a combination of praise and tokens 
for performing housekeeping tasks. A control group was not 
rewarded. All three of the reward conditions produced a 
significant reinforcement effect during the contingency 
phase. The praise and combination procedures had a signifi­
cantly greater reinforcement effect than did the tokens-
only procedure. After rewards were withdrawn, an overjusti-
fication effect occurred only in the tokens-only group. 
Swann and Pittmann (1977) conducted an overjustification 
experiment with children comparing the effects of tangible 
reward with a combination of tangible reward and praise. 
Using the first activity selected during free-play as a 
dependent measure, a reduction in intrinsic motivation 
occurred for the tangible reward group but not for the com­
bination group. 
Dollinger and Thelen (1978) investigated praise and 
tangible rewards with preschool and elementary school sub­
jects. One group of children received food for performing 
a maze task while a second group was praised. Postreward 
performance was significantly less for the food condition 
relative to the unrewarded control. Intrinsic motivation 
for the control group and praise group did not significantly 
differ. 
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Deci (1971) performed two experiments to assess the 
residual effects of monetary and verbal rewards. In the 
first experiment, adult subjects worked on a puzzle task for 
monetary payment or no reward. There were no significant 
differences between the groups in postreward performance of 
the target activity. Experiment III was a replication of 
Experiment I, except that praise was used as a reward. The 
praise had no significant effect on performance measures 
of intrinsic motivation. 
Harackiewicz (1979) found that tangible rewards decreased 
intrinsic motivation while praise enhanced intrinsic, as 
measured by performance and verbal preference measures. 
Weiner and Mander (1978) used three levels of verbal 
feedback crossed with reward-no reward. Following perform­
ance during the contingency session, adult subjects were 
told that their performance was either below average, average, 
or superior to the work of other subjects. While the mone­
tary reward reduced intrinsic motivation as measured by 
postreward performance, the feedback manipulation had no 
significant effect on performance. The feedback had a mar­
ginally significant effect on willingness to volunteer for a 
similar experiment in the future, with level of competence 
being"directly related to willingness to volunteer. 
Danner and Lonky (1981) predicted that the residual 
effects of praise would interact with the individual's locus 
of control. They reasoned that children with an internal 
\ 
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locus of control would perceive praise as an index of compe­
tence, such that intrinsic motivation would be enhanced. 
Children with an external locus of control would tend to see 
praise as an external constraint, which would lead to a 
decrement in intrinsic motivation. Children in this experi­
ment performed for either praise, awards, or no payment. 
Postreward performance indicated that awards were detrimen­
tal to intrinsic reward for those children whose initial 
interest in the target activity was high. Praise decreased 
intrinsic motivation only in children with an external locus 
of control and a high initial interest in the task. Praise 
had no significant effect on the remaining categories of 
subjects. 
The conflicting results discussed above suggest that 
whether the reward is social or tangible is not a critical 
variable in determining the occurrence and magnitude of over-
justification effects. Rather, the degree to which the 
reward manipulation provides feedback as to the subject's 
competence at performing the target activity may be a criti­
cal element (Arkes, 1978). This notion of competence feed­
back has also been proposed to account for the confusion of 
results in the investigation of the reward contingency 
(Rosenfield et al. , 1980). Unfortunately, there is a very 
poor match between the theoretical propositions concerning 
the relationship between competence and intrinsic motivation, 
and the experiments that have been used to investigate 
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competence. The theories of intrinsic motivation (e.g., 
Atkinson, 1974: Deci, 1975, White, 1959) either suggest or 
explicitly state that an inverted-U function describes the 
relationship between competence and intrinsic motivation. 
Intrinsic motivation should be highest with tasks having a 
moderate probability of success, with intrinsic motivation 
being lowest when the individual is extremely incompetent 
or extremely competent. While the theoretical formulations 
suggest a curvilinear relationship, the experimental designs 
typically use two levels of the competence manipulation, so 
that the result necessarily suggests a linear relationship 
or no relationship. Thus, it has been found that intrinsic 
motivation is lower for tasks that are difficult to complete 
to criterion level relative to tasks with an easier success 
criterion (Bandura & Schunk, 1981: C. Fisher, 1978). How­
ever, this relationship should easily be reversed simply by 
using different competence manipulations. Hopefully, further 
research on this issue will employ multiple levels of com­
petence manipulations and thus provide a better test of the 
relevant theories. 
Choice 
The discounting of intrinsic motivation should occur to 
the extent that any plausible external reason for performance 
is available. Thus any manipulation that reduces the percep­
tion of free self-determination should reduce intrinsic 
motivation (DeCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975). In addition, the 
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undermining effects of a reward procedure should be atten­
uated if the reward procedure allows choice or the illusion 
of choice (Dollinger & Thelen, 1978). 
Dollinger and Thelen (1978) investigated personal con­
trol by manipulating the manner in which rewards were deliv­
ered. Children were asked to perform a maze activity. One 
group was rewarded on a piece-rate basis, while another 
group gave themselves rewards according to their own dis­
cretion. Residual performance scores showed an overjusti-
fication effect for the self-reward group, but not for the 
piece-rate group, relative to an unrewarded control condi­
tion. These data were not consistent with predictions derived 
from cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1975). 
Two other studies have yielded results that are incon­
sistent with cognitive evaluation theory. Folger, Rosen-
field, and Hays (1978) crossed a choice manipulation with a 
reward variable. Subjects performed for either an expected 
reward or no reward. Half of the subjects were led to 
believe that participation in the contingency was purely 
voluntary, while half were simply told to participate. A 
significant interaction occurred in the postreward perform­
ance scores. Reward increased intrinsic motivation in the 
low-choice condition, while reward decreased intrinsic moti­
vation for the high-choice subjects. Similar results were 
found by Greene et al. (1976). Using a multiple-reward 
token procedure, subjects were assigned to conditions accord­
ing to prereward baseline performance. High-interest 
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subjects were rewarded for the activities most preferred 
during baseline, while high-choice subjects were allowed to 
choose their own target activities from the various base­
line activities. A postreward performance decrement, rela­
tive to a nondifferentially-rewarded control group, occurred 
in the high-choice condition but not in the high-interest 
condition. 
Swann and Pittmann (1977) found results that were par­
tially supportive of cognitive evaluation theory. Children 
performed a drawing task for expected reward or no reward. 
Half of the children were led to believe that they had a 
choice of target activities, but all subjects were subtly 
induced to select the drawing activity. There were no sig­
nificant differences among groups in postreward performance 
measures. Analysis of the first activity selected during 
postreward free play indicated a significant Reward and 
Choice interaction. The reward manipulation had no effect 
in the low-choice conditions. In the high-choice conditions, 
nonrewarded children chose the target activity more often 
than did the rewarded subjects. The no-reward, high-choice 
produced the highest proportion of first selection of the 
target activity. 
Folger et al. (1978) explained the failures to confirm 
Deci's (1975) predictions by using an equity theory (Adams, 
1965t Walster & Berscheid, 1973) analysis. According to this 
approach, persons are motivated to achieve an equivalence of 
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input-output comparisons between the two actors in a social 
dyad. When an experimenter delivers overly sufficient 
reward, the subject is in a state of inequity. This inequity 
can be reduced by increasing task performance so that the 
subject's output moves toward the level of the input of the 
reward. This motivation toward equity should occur, however, 
only when the subject has freely entered into the situation; 
inequity (dissonance) is not aroused when the subject is 
forced to participate in the contingency. Thus» overly 
sufficient rewards should increase intrinsic motivation in 
high-choice situations, while other factors (e.g., discount­
ing) may decrease intrinsic motivation when reward is given 
in a low-choice situation. 
Other Manipulations 
All of the theoretical approaches to overjustification 
contain some notion of control, constraint, or disruption 
(real or imagined) imposed by reward procedures as being 
critical to changes in intrinsic motivation. Therefore, any 
number of manipulations that might lead to differing per­
ceptions of external control should have an effect on intrin­
sic motivation. Performing in front of an audience, for 
example, might lead the individual to perceive himself as 
being motivated to obtain positive external evaluation and/or 
avoid negative external evaluation (e.g., Cottrell, 1972; 
Good, 1973; Seta & Hassan, 1980; Weiss & Miller, 1971). 
Lepper and Greene (1975) found that prior performance under 
V 
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the surveillance of a television camera led to a reduction 
in postreward performance of the target activity as compared 
with subjects who performed without surveillance. Amabile 
(1979) found that anticipation of external critical evaluation 
produced lower-quality artwork and reduced verbal preference 
measures of intrinsic motivation. Similarly, the imposition 
of a deadline led to a reduction in expressed interest in a 
target activity (Amabile, De Jong, & Lepper, 1976). 
Deci, Betley, Kahle, Abrams, and Porac (1981) tested 
the hypothesis that competition, which involves the imposi­
tion of external comparisons, reduces intrinsic motivation. 
College students performed a puzzle activity under either 
competitive or non-competitive conditions. There was no 
significant difference between the groups on post-reward 
performance measures. It is quite possible that competition 
can have a number of effects on intrinsic motivation (e.g., 
increased feelings of competence) other than producing an 
external locus of causality (Deci & Ryan, 1980). 
Finally, if the imposition of extrinsic reward procedures 
leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation, then removing 
or reducing the magnitude of external reward should increase 
intrinsic motivation. Weick (1964) recruited volunteers for 
an experiment with explicit instructions that the subjects 
would receive course credit for participation. Upon arriving 
at the experiment, half of the subjects were told that the 
anticipated course credit would not be given. Both verbal 
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and performance measures indicated an increase in intrinsic 
motivation for subjects who had the reward withdrawn rela­
tive to subjects receiving the anticipated reward. Staw 
(1974) conducted a field study investigation of intrinsic 
motivation towards Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC). 
Staw reasoned that many of the candidates had joined the 
ROTC program for external reasons, to avoid being drafted. 
The candidates subsequently drew a draft lottery number that 
changed the probability of being drafted. Subjects with 
high lottery numbers (low probability of being drafted) 
showed an increase in expressed liking for ROTC. 
The two studies just reviewed raise an interesting 
point. If the removal or reduction of external constraints 
leads to an increase in intrinsic motivation, why do over-
justification effects occur at all? One might argue that, 
in the standard postreward performance situation, the lack 
of external constraints would lead to an internal attribution, 
so that no overjustification effects would occur. Clearly, 
if attributional analyses are to develop into precise theo­
retical statements, the finer points concerning the persis­
tence of causal attributions must be investigated (Carstens 
& Seta, Note 2). 
Quality of Performance 
A number of experiments have explored the possibility 
that incentives can have deleterious effects on the quality 
of contingency-session performance. Kruglanski, Friedman, 
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and Zeevi (1971) found that children anticipating reward, 
relative to unrewarded controls, exhibited reduced creativity, 
decrements in recall of task features, and lower reported 
preference for the target activity. Kruglanski et al. sug­
gested that reward induces concentration on rate of produc­
tion in order to obtain reward, whereas unconstrained subjects 
are more likely to attend to features of the task itself. 
In addition to attentional and cognitive effects, rewards 
may induce affective states that interfere with performance. 
A number of studies have yielded results consistent 
with those of Kruglanski et al. (1971). Lepper et al. (1973) 
found that children anticipating reward produced lower-quality 
drawings than did children not expecting reward. Gabarino 
(1975) examined the effects of expected reward on children's 
tutoring skills. Rewarded children were more demanding and 
more critical, while unrewarded tutors were more likely to 
use praise. The learners had fewer errors with unrewarded 
tutors. 
Morgan (1981) obtained data supporting Kruglanski 
et al.'s (1971) contention that anticipation of reward may 
produce affective arousal. Children in Morgan's study were 
rated by an experimenter on their level of enjoyment during 
contingency-session responding. Rewarded subjects received 
significantly higher enjoyment ratings than did unrewarded 
controls. No evidence was presented, however, indicating 
that differences in enjoyment were correlated with level of 
performance on the puzzle task. 
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McGraw and McCullers (1979) found results indicating 
that incentives can interfere with performance on a complex 
cognitive task. Adult subjects performed a series of ten 
water-jar problems under conditions of anticipated reward or 
no reward. The first nine problems all required the same 
solution set, while the tenth problem involved a different 
solution set. There were no differences among groups in 
solution time on problems 1-9. On Problem 10, however, 
mean solution latency was significantly longer for the 
rewarded group. Interestingly, verbal preference measures 
for the water-jar task yielded no significant effects. 
Other studies have failed to replicate the finding 
that the anticipation of reward is associated with qualita­
tive performance decrements. Fazio (1981) and Loveland and 
Olley (1979) found no differences between rewarded and 
unrewarded children in quality of drawings, similar to the 
task used by Lepper et al. (1973). Enzle and Ross (1978) 
found that reward had no effect during the contingency period 
on either number of puzzles attempted or number successfully 
completed. Reward conditions had no effect on the quality of 
maze performance in children in a study reported by Doll-
inger and Thelen (1978). Pritchard et al. (1977) found no 
effect of reward on either number of chess problems attempted 
or successfully solved. 
A few studies have examined the correlations between an 
individual's contingency-session performance quality on 
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subsequent interest in the experimental task. Ransen (1980) 
found a modest negative correlation (r = -.30) between quality 
and postreward decline in performance times. This correla­
tion is consistent with Reiss and Sushinsky's (1975) asser­
tion that reductions in intrinsic interest following reward 
result from low-quality play. Ross et al. (1976) and Pritch-
ard et al. (1977) found no significant correlations between 
quality measures and postreward intrinsic interest. 
Although the findings are ambiguous, it does appear 
that anticipated rewards may have immediate detrimental 
effects on quality of performance. It should be noted that 
most overjustification studies have not specifically been 
designed to provide sensitive qualitative measures. 
It is not clear at this point what the relationship 
is between immediate qualitative and residual motivational 
effects. Reiss and Shusinsky (1975, 1976) argue that 
decreased postreward performance is caused by low-quality 
play. Kruglanski et al. (1971) argue that both types of 
effects are the result of the individual's cognitive orien­
tation toward the target activity during contingency session 
performance. McGraw and McCullers (1979) suggest that the 
data do not provide strong support for any hypothesis concern­
ing the relationship between performance quality and residual 
intrinsic motivation decrements. McGraw and McCullers cite 
as exemplars two results of their own study. First, incen­
tive interfered only with the solution of the final set-
breaking problem, even though the initial nine problems 
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required a more complex solution. Second, this pattern 
occurred in the absence of a postreward preference decre­
ment. Neither a distraction nor a cognitive-orientation 
approach explains the selective interference effects due 
to reward; neither approach explains the lack of correlation 
between quality and preference measures. 
Summary 
Rewards and other external motivational factors can 
impair subsequent intrinsic motivation. This is especially 
likely to happen when the external factor is made salient 
to the subject, and when the target activity is interesting 
to the subject prior to experimental manipulations. Over-
justification effects can be moderated by providing feedback 
about the source of the subject's motivation, and the sub­
ject's competence at the target task. In addition to affect­
ing subsequent task motivation, rewards and other external 
motivational factors can have immediate effects on the 
quality of performance, particularly with creative activities 
and complex problem-solving tasks. 
While the extant data are interesting and stimulating, 
we are far from a comprehensive theoretical understanding of 
the phenomena. Attributional analyses, because of their 
ability to explain the operation of different independent 
variables, provide the most comprehensive account of the 
diversity of the results in the overjustification literature. 
Yet the strength of this approach is purchased at the price 
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of a lack of precision and testability (Bern, 1972: David­
son & Bucher, 1976: Feingold & Mahoney, 1975: Reiss & 
Sushinsky, 1975, 1976; Ross, 1975). This lack of precision 
is illustrated, for example, by the ambiguity in predicting 
the role of reinforcement/incentive effects as antecedents 
for subsequent overjustification effects. In addition, 
attributional analyses can easily be misused by well-
intentioned investigators, if the mediating theoretical 
concepts are allowed to free-float, independent of ante­
cedent conditions (Bern, 1972). 
While the attributional analyses have definite short­
comings as testable scientific propositions, it is not clear 
that the alternative hypotheses fare much better in this 
regard. Williams1 (1980) two-factor theory is an explicit 
attempt to provide a more rigorous and testable account of 
overjustification effects. The two-factor model states 
(1) that reward procedures have both excitatory and inhibi­
tory components, and (2) that these opponent processes can 
be independently manipulated to produce predictable effects 
on measures of subsequent motivation. The first proposition 
is a logical necessity, given that rewards do indeed have 
excitatory and inhibitory effects. The veracity of the 
second proposition is not self-evident. That is, it is not 
clearly the case that reward value and behavior constraint 
are independent components with operationally distinct ante­
cedents. Both components, in fact, refer to controlling or 
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constraining features of reward procedures. As the rein­
forcing power of the reward procedure increases, both the 
components should increase in magnitude. At the present 
time we have no clear means of predicting the relative 
growth rates of the two components. 
The same criticism concerning precision and testability 
may also be leveled at the competing-response hypothesis. 
Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) argue that the occurrence of over-
justification effects in the absence of evidence of incom­
patible behaviors elicited by the reward procedure is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the competing response hypoth­
esis. If such a pattern emerges, then the experimenter must 
have measured the wrong competing response/ or used a poor 
measure of that response. This logic suggests that an ade­
quate test of the competing-response hypothesis must include 
valid measures, direct or indirect, of perceptual and cogni­
tive distraction, frustration, general arousal, and perhaps 
an unspecified host of other potentially interfering behav­
iors. Such an experiment is probably beyond the technical 
expertise of contemporary experimental psychology. Recall 
that the competing-response hypothesis was initially form­
ulated, in part, to remediate the post-hoc flexibility of 
attributional analyses. 
Finally, it should be noted that a behavioral contrast 
approach does not provide, at the present time, a theoret­
ical panacea. The contrast-oriented theorists (e.g., 
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Davidson & Bucher, 1978; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Mawhinney, 
1979) have been long on the restatement of metatheoretical 
assumptions and short on the production of data that bear 
directly on the relevance of behavioral contrast to over-
justification phenomena. As noted previously, overjustifica­
tion experiments were not designed for this purpose. The 
evaluation of behavioral contrast propositions within a 
human social context may prove to be a difficult undertak­
ing. The assumption that there are lawful, cross-specific 
principles of behavior does not imply that methods used in 
animal learning laboratories can be transferred wholesale 
to the context of human social behavior. Such a crossing of 
areas needs to take into account the variety of external 
control factors in human behavior and the complexity of 
response dimensions. 
Two additional problems must be addressed if a success­
ful integration of the literatures of behavioral contrast 
and overjustification occurs. If it can be demonstrated 
that contrast and overjustification are accounted for by 
common principles, then the problem still remains of form­
ulating a satisfactory explanation of behavioral contrast 
phenomena. Assuming that this occurs, it may not be the 
case that a theory of contrast would be accepted as such by 
social psychologists, because of divergent metatheoretical 
assumptions. In the ideal Skinnerian theory, the elements 
of the theory refer directly to observable events. In 
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cognitive and social psychology, propositions of that sort 
are often not acknowledged as theories (e.g., Underwood, 
1975). 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT I 
As indicated in the literature review, there is little 
consensus as to why overjustification effects occur. One 
reason for this state of affairs is that the competing 
theoretical analyses often make similar predictions for a 
given set of circumstances. Recall, for example, the con­
sistent finding that the probability of overjustification 
effects increases as a function of the salience of the 
reward. This would be predicted by both attributional and 
nonattributional models of overjustification. The present 
experiment is designed to provide a test of attribution 
theory in an overjustification procedure in which the non­
attributional approaches make no obvious predictions. 
The theories of overjustification can be divided into 
two sets: those that emphasize the role of discounting as a 
mediating variable, and theories that focus on the role of 
incentives in altering treatment-session performance. The 
latter group of theories have been called performance-
mediation accounts (Deci & Ryan, 1980). There is no doubt 
that both discounting and treatment-session performance dif­
ferentials can occur in the overjustification paradigm. The 
problem to be addressed here is the degree to which these 
effects are necessary antecedents of posttreatment value 
shifts. 
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One distinctive feature of the discounting analysis 
concerns the timing of the mediating attribution. The role 
of intrinsic motivation for performing a target activity 
can be discounted either before, during, or after the treat­
ment session. As long as intrinsic motivation is discounted 
prior to the test session, overjustification effects should 
occur. Retrospective discounting of intrinsic motivation 
should occur under any of the following circumstances. 
First, the individual may acquire information about a plausi­
ble external cause which was not known to exist at the time 
of performance. Second, the individual may be aware of the 
existence of an external factor, but may assign that factor 
a causal role only on the basis of information acquired 
after the termination of performance. Third, the individual 
may forget about some external factor that was present dur­
ing performance, and then make a retrospective attribution 
when reminded of the factor. 
Procedures that induce either retrospective discounting 
or discounting concurrent with performance should both lead 
to overjustification effects. The difference in the two 
kinds of procedures would involve salience. One would 
generally expect that an external factor which leads to 
concurrent discounting would be more salient than a factor 
that induces only retrospective discounting. 
The performance-mediation models assume that overjus-
tification effects occur because the reward procedure has 
68 
altered treatment session performance so as to make the 
target activity less preferred. These models can only make 
predictions about external factors (rewards, surveillance, 
etc.) that are introduced before or during the treatment 
session. The performance mediation models are summarized 
below: 
(1) Satiation-boredom: The incentive manipulation 
produces an increase in the frequency or duration of the 
target activity during the treatment session, relative to 
unrewarded controls. The rewarded subjects become differen­
tially fatigued with the target activity so that posttreatment 
performance deficits occur (Calder & Staw, 1975a; Scott, 1976). 
(2) Behavioral or incentive contrast; The reward pro­
cedure produces reinforcement or incentive effects during 
the treatment session, which are functionally related to 
negative contrast effects during extinction. Reinforcement, 
by definition, changes the distribution of activities that 
would normally occur in a free-choice setting. The direction 
and magnitude of posttreatment value shifts can be predicted 
from the nature of the contingency and its effects during the 
treatment session (Catania, 1973; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; 
Mawhinney, 1979; Fuoco, Note 3). 
(3) Qualitative differences: Rewarded and unrewarded 
performance of some activity may be comparable in terms of 
gross measures of frequency and duration, yet differ in more 
molecular aspects. Performance under a reward contingency 
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can produce a rigidity of cognitive set, a difficulty in 
changing problem-solving tactics (McGraw & McCullers, 1979). 
In addition, reward contingencies can induce stereotyped 
responding, such that there is a reduction in the variability 
of response sequences (Schwartz, 1982a, 1982b). 
(4) Competing responses: The competing-response hypoth­
esis (Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975, 1976) is an omnibus descrip­
tion of performance-mediation effects. Incentive procedures 
can elicit a variety of responses that are incompatible with 
full enjoyment of the target activity. These competing 
responses include excitement in anticipating reward or 
frustration in having to wait for a reward (Ross, Karniol, 
& Rothstein, 1976): hurried performance accompanied by poorer 
quality work (Lepper et al., 1973); and attending to the 
reward rather than concentrating on the task. 
Several theorists (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1980: Lepper, 
Sagotsky, Dafoe, & Greene, 1982) have argued that performance-
mediation effects are not necessary antecedents of overjusi-
fication effects. This argument is based on the fact that 
several studies (e.g., Deci, Cascio, & Krusell, 1975: Lepper 
et al., 1982) have obtained overjustification effects while 
prior performance during the treatment session did not differ 
among experimental groups. Support of a theoretical position 
on the basis of the null hypothesis is always open to crit­
icism. The experimenters may have selected insensitive 
measures of performance, or may have neglected to assess 
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some critical performance mediators. These criticisms are 
applicable in the present context for several reasons. 
First, given the wide range of potential performance med­
iators , it would be extremely difficult to provide exhaus­
tive measures within a single experiment. Second, some of 
the proposed performance-mediators (e.g., stereotyped response 
sequences) require specially designed tasks in order to 
obtain sensitive measures. Finally, the primary dependent 
variable in overjustification studies is posttreatment value 
rather than treatment-session performance, and the assess­
ment procedures reflect this emphasis. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that many published reports contain no mention 
of possible treatment-session performance differentials. 
There is one published study in which overjustification 
effects were obtained using a procedure that ruled out the 
possibility of performance mediators. Kruglanski, Alon, and 
Lewis (1972) led elementary school children in a number of 
games. In the reward condition, the subjects were given a 
prize after participating in the games. The children were 
led to believe that they had been promised a reward prior to 
initiating the games, but in fact reward was not mentioned 
until the games were completed. Children in a control group 
neither expected nor received any prizes. All subjects 
answered a posttreatment questionnaire concerning the per­
ceived locus of causality and preference for the games. The 
rewarded subjects liked the games less than did the control 
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subjects, and they tended to attribute performance to 
extrinsic rather than to intrinsic motivation. Kruglanski 
et al. attributed these results to retrospective discount­
ing. Performance-mediation explanations were ruled out 
because the groups were treated identically before and during 
the treatment session. 
The major purpose of the present study was to provide 
another test of a discounting interpretation of overjustifi-
cation effects. As in the Kruglanski et al. (1972) experi­
ment, performance-mediation explanations were ruled out by 
the use of a retrospective misattribution procedure. This 
was done with a bogus subliminal perception manipulation. 
Subjects performed a target activity while listening to a 
taped selection of background music. At the end of the per­
formance session, subjects were told that the music contained 
subliminal messages encouraging them to perform and to enjoy 
the target, activity. To the extent that subjects attribute 
performance to the subception procedure, intrinsic motiva­
tion should be discounted, and the value of the target 
activity should be reduced in a subsequent free-choice assess­
ment period. As in the Kruglanski et al. (1972) experiment, 
control and experimental subjects were treated in the same 
way before and during the treatment session. 
Some additional factors were investigated in the present 
study. If an external facilitative "cause" induces a dis­
counting of intrinsic motivation, then performing an activity 
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in the presence of an inhibitory "cause" should lead to an 
increase in perceived intrinsic motivation. This is called 
the augmenting principle, and is considered to be a corollary 
of the discounting principle (Kelley, 1973). Some subjects 
were told that the subliminal messages discouraged perform­
ance of and enjoyment of the target activity. Subjects in 
these circumstances should make a strong internal attribu­
tion, given that they performed the target activity even 
though external conditions discouraged performance. This 
augmenting of perceived intrinsic motivation should lead to 
high target activity value during the posttreatment perform­
ance assessment. 
In order to make the subception manipulation more 
credible, a second independent variable was included. Dur­
ing the initial performance session, subjects had their 
galvanic skin response (GSR) assessed. After the end of the 
treatment session, some subjects were given false feedback 
as to the physiological measure of preference. In the 
Ineffective Feedback conditions, subjects were told that the 
subliminal messages had no effect on GSR, i.e., that the GSR 
readings indicated no specific preference for the target 
activity. In the Effective Feedback conditions, subjects 
were informed that the subliminal messages influenced GSR 
output. If the subliminal messages encouraged target activ­
ity performance, then the GSR indicated a strong preference 
for the target activity. If the subception procedure 
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discouraged performance, then the GSR indicated a low pref­
erence for the target activity. In a third condition, no 
GSR feedback was given. 
In summary, the independent variables were Subliminal 
Message (Encourage or Discourage) and GSR Feedback (Inef­
fective, Effective, or No Feedback). A control group received 
no information about either subliminal perception or GSR 
feedback. The primary dependent measure was preference for 
the target activity in a subsequent free choice setting. 
Attribution theory would predict an interaction between the 
content of the subliminal message and the GSR feedback. In 
the Effective Feedback conditions, subjects were explicitly 
told that the subception procedure had influenced prefer­
ence , which should induce external attributions. This should 
produce an augmenting of perceived intrinsic motivation in 
the Discourage condition, and a discounting of intrinsic 
motivation in the Encourage group. Thus, posttreatment 
target activity value should be higher in the Discourage-
Effective group than in the Encourage-Effective group. In 
the Ineffective feedback conditions, subjects are told that 
the subliminal messages exercised no functional control over 
responding. These subjects should not make external attri­
butions, and there should be no significant differences in 
target activity value between the Encourage-Ineffective and 
Discourage-Ineffective groups. For the No Feedback condi­
tions , the posttreatment preference for the target activity 
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should depend on the subjects' inferences of causality. If 
the subjects assume that the subliminal messages exercised 
control over responding, then discounting and augmenting 
effects should occur as in the Effective Feedback conditions. 
It should be emphasized that the present study is not a 
test of the performance-mediation hypotheses of overjustifica­
tion effects. Those hypotheses make no clear-cut predictions 
about value shifts under these conditions. Rather, the pur­
pose is to provide a test of the attributional analysis in a 
situation that is "uncontaminated" by performance-mediation 
effects. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 70 women recruited from undergraduate 
psychology courses at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. They ranged in age from 18 to 48 years. The 
students received course credit for participating in the 
study. The subjects were randomly assigned to the seven 
conditions, with the stipulation that each condition would 
have an equal number of subjects. 
Experimental Design and Dependent Measures 
A 2 x 3 x 2 mixed between- and within-subjects design 
was used. The between-subjects factors were Subliminal 
Message (Encourage or Discourage) and GSR Feedback (Effective, 
Ineffective, or No Feedback). The within-subjects factor 
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was Sessions (1 and 2). A control condition, not contained 
in the factorial, received no information about either the 
subliminal suggestion or the GSR recordings. 
Dependent variables included performance measures from 
Sessions 1 and 2, and questionnaire responses taken at the 
end of Session 2. An interval-sampling procedure was used 
for the performance measures: each 8-minute session was 
divided into 32 15-second intervals. The experimenter 
recorded whether the subject performed each of the three 
experimental activities for each interval. (See Appendix A, 
Data Sheet.) The postexperimental questionnaire contained 
items pertaining to intrinsic, motivation for the experimental 
activities, credibility checks, and some filler items. (See 
Appendix B, Questionnaire.) 
Apparatus 
The experimental activities were chosen because of their 
interest to adults and because similar or identical items 
have been used as target activities in published overjusti-
fication studies. The activities were "Labyrinth," a maze 
game: "Space Probe," a game in which two steel rods are 
manipulated so that a ball balanced upon them falls into 
numbered holes; and "Encore," an electronic display of eight 
lights in which the player matches increasingly complex 
s equences of lights. 
The GSR machine was a Fels Dermohmeter, Model 22A, 
Yellow Springs Instrument Co. 
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Procedure 
Each subject was run individually by a male graduate 
student. The experimenter explained that the purpose of the 
study was to assess verbal and physiological preference for 
certain activities. (See Appendix C, Instructions, Exper­
iment I.) The subject was told that she would be asked to 
sample some interesting activities, during which time GSR 
measures would be recorded. Following this procedure, the 
subject would be asked to complete a questionnaire concerning 
her opinion of the activities. Prior to beginning Session 1, 
each subject signed a consent form acknowledging voluntary 
participation. 
The experimenter briefly demonstrated the use of the 
three experimental activities, then attached the GSR elec­
trodes to the subject's left wrist. The subject was then 
asked to freely sample the activities for the following 
8 minutes, with the stipulation that each activity should be 
tried at least once. At this point the experimenter switched 
on a recording of instrumental music. For the next 8 minutes 
the experimenter sat across the room, out of the subject's 
direct view, presumably monitoring the GSR equipment. 
Actually the experimenter was recording the subject's choice 
of activities. 
At the end of 8 minutes, the experimenter switched off 
the music, removed the GSR electrodes, and began the false 
debriefing procedure for subjects in the experimental 
77 
conditions. The experimenter briefly explained the nature 
of subliminal suggestion, and told the subject that the 
recorded music contained verbal messages designed to influ­
ence preference for the target activity. In the Encourage 
conditions, the messages consisted of exhortations to play 
with and to enjoy the target activity. In the Discourage 
conditions, the messages informed the subject that the 
/ 
target activity was unenjoyable and should be avoided. In 
order to lend credibility to the manipulation, the exper­
imenter played a demonstration tape in which the subliminal 
messages were "enhanced" so that they were clearly audible 
(see Appendix C). 
In all conditions the target activity was designated as 
the individual subject's second most preferred activity 
during Session 1. 
Following the demonstration of the hidden messages, sub­
jects in the feedback conditions were given information about 
the effects of the subliminal messages on their GSR measures. 
In the Ineffective feedback conditions, subjects were told 
that the subliminal suggestions had no influence on GSR. 
Subjects in the Effective feedback conditions were told that 
there was either a marked increase or decrease in GSR during 
performance of the target activity, in accord with the con­
tent of the subliminal messages. 
Subjects in the Control condition were told nothing about 
the target activity, subliminal messages, or the outcome of 
the GSR recordings. 
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At this point the experimenter excused himself to get 
the questionnaire and to "check on another person working on 
another experiment." The subject was asked to wait in the 
laboratory, and told to feel free to sample the experimental 
activities during the interim if she so desired. For the 
next 8 minutes the experimenter recorded the subject's choice 
of activities from an adjacent room through a one-way mirror. 
At the end of Session 2, the experimenter returned with the 
questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, the sub­
ject was thanked and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Three subjects initiated the experiment but were excused 
before completing Session 2 7 their data are not included in 
any analyses. Two of the subjects failed to sample all three 
activities during Session 1 as requested, so they were 
excused at the end of Session 1. The third subject was 
excused during Session 2 because of a disturbance in an 
adjacent laboratory room. Three additional subjects were 
run so that there were 10 in each condition. 
Verbal Data 
Several of the items on the questionnaire dealt with 
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the subjects' recall of experimental manipulations. Two 
items (Q4a, Q8a) asked if the music contained subliminal 
messages. Eighty-eight percent of subjects in the exper­
imental groups answered "Yes" to these items. The remainder, 
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when individually questioned, recalled being informed about 
the subliminal message, but answered the items in the nega­
tive because they hadn't heard the messages during Session 1. 
All of the subjects who reported that the music contained 
subliminal messages correctly recalled the content of the 
messages (Q4b). When asked about GSR feedback (Q6), 97% of 
the subjects in the experimental conditions correctly reported 
whether feedback was given, and the content of the feedback 
when it was administered. 
Three questionnaire items provided a check on the cred­
ibility of the GSR feedback and subliminal message manipula­
tions. One question (Q7) asked if the subjects felt that 
the GSR was an accurate measure of attitudes towards the 
experimental activities. On a scale of 1 to 9, with 1 indi­
cating an extremely invalid and 9 an extremely valid measure, 
subjects in the feedback conditions had a mean rating of 
6.17. This suggests that the GSR feedback manipulation was 
somewhat credible. There were no significant differences 
among the four feedback groups on this question. 
Item 8b asked the subjects to report the extent to which 
they believed that the subliminal messages affected their 
attitudes towards the experimental activities. The mean 
responses on this item are shown in Table 2. In the Effec­
tive Feedback conditions, subjects said that the subliminal 
messages had a substantial effect on attitudes (M = 5.00) 
while subjects in the Ineffective Feedback groups reported 
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little effect from the subliminal messages (M = 1.47). The 
mean for the No Feedback conditions fell between those of the 
Effective and Ineffective Feedback groups (M = 3.15). This 
main effect for GSR feedback was significant at the .01 
level (see Table 3 for a summary of the analysis. The main 
effect for Subliminal and the interaction were not signifi­
cant. These data provide further support for the credibility 
of the GSR Feedback procedure. 
Q5 asked the subjects to estimate the time spent on the 
target activity during Session 1. The mean percentage esti­
mates are shown in Table 4, and a summary of the statistical 
analysis in Table 5. Both main effects and the interaction 
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were statistically significant. Post-hoc analyses indicate 
that, in the Encourage-Effective condition, subjects estimated 
a higher proportion of time spent on the target activity, 
relative to estimates in the Encourage-No Feedback and Dis-
courage-Effective conditions. There were only slight dif­
ferences among the three Discourage conditions. None of the 
experimental group means were significantly different from 
the control mean, although there was a trend (£ <.10) towards 
higher estimates in the Encourage-Effective condition. These 
results suggest that subjects in the Encourage-Effective 
group believed that the subliminal message effectively induced 
them to perform the target activity during Session 1. The 
lack of a complementary effect in the Discourage-Effective 
condition may be due to the fact that all of the experimental 
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activities were fairly interesting. It may have been diffi­
cult for subjects in the Discourage conditions to believe 
that the subliminal suggestions could significantly disrupt 
enjoyment of an interesting target activity. 
One question (Q12) was intended as a check on the suc­
cessful selection of three interesting experimental activ­
ities. Subjects were asked if they found the activities, on 
the whole, to be interesting. On a scale of 1-9, with 9 
being extremely interesting, the mean rating across groups 
was 7.67. This finding supports the notion that the three 
activities were fairly interesting. There were no differ­
ences among the conditions on this item. 
Two questions of special interest were Q1 and Q9, which 
asked the subjects to rate the target activity in terms of 
"enjoyment" and "interest," respectively. Each subject's 
responses on these two items were summed to obtain a verbal 
measure of value. The means are shown in Table 6, and a 
summary of the analysis in Table 7. The main effect for 
Subliminal was significant at the .05 level, with Encourage 
(M = 12.53) being higher than Discourage (M = 10.03). This 
is a compliance effect; subjects who received "subliminal" 
suggestions to enjoy the target activity rated the activity 
higher than did subjects who were instructed to dislike the 
activity. The main effect for GSR Feedback was also signif­
icant (jo < . 01). Post-hoc analyses indicate that the mean 
rating for the No-Feedback conditions (9.65) was significantly 
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lower than the mean of the Effective Feedback conditions 
(12.20). The Dunetts test indicated lower values for the 
two No-Feedback conditions, and for the Augment-Effective 
condition, relative to the control group. The Subliminal 
x GSR Feedback interaction was not significant. The reason 
for the low values in the No-Feedback conditions is not 
clear. 
One final question (Q13) was an attempt to assess the 
subjects * locus of causality for performing the target 
activity. In this item the subjects were asked, on a 1-9 
continuum, whether they performed the target activity pri­
marily because it was enjoyable, or for "other reasons." 
There were no significant differences among the groups on 
this item. See Tables 8 and 9. 
Performance Data 
The primary dependent variable in this experiment is the 
amount of play with the target activity during the post-
treatment test session. This measure is assumed to be the 
most valid measure of value, because pains were taken to 
ensure that the subjects were unaware of being observed. 
The verbal measures qf value, on the other hand, may have 
been more easily influenced by demand characteristics, since 
the subjects could easily deduce that the questionnaires 
would be evaluated. 
Table 10 shows the mean number of intervals in which 
subjects performed the target activity during Session 2. 
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The analysis of those data is summarized in Table 11. The 
main effect for Subliminal was significant at the .05 level, 
with Encourage producing higher values (M = 9.20) than Dis­
courage (M = 4.43). Neither the main effect for GSR Feed­
back nor the interaction were statistically significant. 
The Dunnetts test indicates that none of the experimental 
conditions were significantly different from the control 
group. These results indicate a compliance effect: when the 
"subliminal message" encouraged subjects to perform the 
target activity, target activity value was higher than in the 
Discourage conditions, where performance of the target activ­
ity was discouraged. 
An additional analysis was conducted in order to deter­
mine whether the differences in target activity value were 
specific to the target activity or were a function of dif­
ferences in performance of all the experimental activities. 
Table 12 shows the means for total intervals in which sub­
jects performed any of the three activities during Session 2. 
As shown in Table 13, there were no significant differences 
among the experimental groups, which indicates that general 
performance increments or decrements cannot account for the 
target activity value data. 
Finally, a series of three analyses were performed to 
check for any pretreatment differences among groups. A 
one-way ANOVA, with seven levels, was run on the number of 
intervals in which subjects performed the experimental 
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activities during Session 1. A separate analysis was run 
for each activity. There were no significant differences 
in any of the analyses (all F's<1.00). 
The results of Experiment I indicate that subjects 
tended to comply with the content of the subliminal messages. 
The absence of an interaction between GSR Feedback and Sub­
liminal Message is inconsistent with a discounting hypoth­
esis. It was predicted that, especially in the Effective 
GSR conditions, subjects would infer that target activity 
performance was controlled, at least in part, by the sublim­
inal message. These external attributions should have been 
accompanied by either discounting or augmenting of perceived 
intrinsic motivation, which should have been reflected in 
posttreatment target activity performance. One possible 
explanation for the failure to obtain an interaction is that 
the independent variables were simply ineffective in influ­
encing perceptions of causality. The questionnaire data do 
not support this hypothesis. Recall that subjects reported 
that the "subliminal message" had at least a moderate influ­
ence on attitudes in the Effective GSR conditions, signifi­
cantly higher than the degree of influence reported by sub­
jects in the Ineffective GSR conditions. Subjects also 
estimated that performance of the target activity during 
Session 1 was consistent with the sanctions of the subliminal 
message. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT II 
A second experiment was designed to provide another 
means of manipulating the subjects' perceptions of causality. 
Both cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1975: Deci & Ryan, 
1981) and reactance theory (Brehm, 1966t Wicklund, 1974) 
suggest that a demonstration of functional external con­
straint is not a necessary antecedent of oppositional or 
countercontrol behavior. Rather, it is sufficient that 
free performance only be threatened. If subjects perceive 
an attempt to control performance of the target activity, 
they should respond by altering the value of the activity in 
the opposite direction of the constraint attempt. In Exper­
iment II, the salience of constraint was manipulated by dif­
ferent instructions describing the purpose of the subliminal 
stimulation. In the High Salience conditions, subjects were 
told that subception is a brainwashing technique, typically 
used for mind control. In the Low Salience conditions, sub­
ception was described as a test of sensitivity to subtle 
auditory stimuli. Assuming that a salient attempt at con­
straint is sufficient to produce overjustification effects, 
then oppositional behavior should occur in the High Salience 
procedure. On the basis of Experiment I, it was predicted 
that compliance effects would occur in the Low Salience con­
ditions . 
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Method 
Experiment II differed from Experiment I in that dif­
ferent means were used to manipulate the salience of con­
trol. In Experiment II, the subliminal suggestion procedure 
was described to the subjects as either a mind-control tech­
nique or as a test of sensitivity to subtle auditory stimuli. 
The equipment, location, activities, experimenter, and 
dependent measures were the same in both experiments. 
Subjects 
The subjects were 45 women recruited from undergraduate 
psychology courses at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. They ranged in age from 18 to 50 years. All 
but seven of the subjects received some form of course 
credit for participating in the study. The subjects were 
randomly assigned to the five conditions, with the stipula­
tion that each condition would have an equal number of sub­
jects . 
Procedure 
Sessions 1 and 2 were conducted in the same way as in 
Experiment I. At the end of Session 1, half of the exper­
imental subjects were told that they had been exposed to 
the Encourage subliminal messages, while the remainder were 
told that they had heard Discourage messages. The Subliminal 
message variable was crossed with a Salience factor (High 
or Low). In the High salience conditions, the subliminal 
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suggestion procedure was presented as a mind-control tech­
nique. This communication contained a number of words 
designed to enhance the controlling aspect of subliminal 
persuasion, such as "commands," "coerce," "force," and 
"brainwashing." (See Appendix D, Instructions, Exper­
iment II ) In the Low salience conditions, the subliminal 
suggestion procedure was described as a test of sensitivity 
to subtle cues. None of the participants received any GSR 
feedback. The procedures for the control condition were the 
same as in Experiment I. 
Results and Discussion 
Four subjects initiated the experiment but were excused 
before beginning Session 2; their data are not included in 
any analyses. Two of the subjects failed to sample all three 
activities during Session 1 as requested, and two quit per­
forming the activities during Session 1. Four additional 
subjects were run so that there were nine in each condition. 
Verbal Data 
Two of the questionnaire items (Q4a, Q8a) asked if the 
music contained subliminal messages. The percentage of 
subjects in the experimental groups who responded in the 
affirmative was 77.5%. Of those subjects who acknowledged 
that the music contained hidden messages, 87% correctly 
reported the content of the messages (Q4b). 
Two questionnaire items were designed to determine if 
the subjects believed that attitudes or performance had been 
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affected by the subception procedure. On one item (Q8b), 
subjects reported the extent to which they believed that the 
subliminal messages affected their attitudes towards the 
experimental activities. The mean responses to this item are 
shown in Table 14. There were no significant differences 
among the experimental groups (Table 15). The overall mean 
response on this item (M = 2.78) was comparable to the mean 
response on the same item for the No Feedback conditions 
(M = 3.15) in Experiment I. 
On Q5, subjects were asked to estimate the time spent 
on the target activity during Session 1. The mean percen­
tage estimates are shown in Table 16. There were no signifr-
icant differences among groups on this item (Table 17). 
Item 12, which asked the subjects to rate the experimen­
tal activities as a whole, was included as a check on the 
intrinsic interest of the activities. The mean rating, 
across all conditions, was 7.67 on a 1-9 scale. This was 
the same mean rating obtained in Experiment I, again indicat­
ing that the activities were interesting. There were no dif­
ferences among conditions on this item. 
Questions 1 and 9 asked the subjects to rate the target 
activity in terms of "enjoyment" and "interest," respec­
tively. Each subject's responses to these items were summed 
to obtain a verbal measure of value. The means are shown in 
Table 18. There were no significant differences among 
groups (Table 19). 
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One final question (Q13) was included to assess the per­
ceived locus of causality for performing the target activity. 
Subjects were asked, on a 1-9 scale, whether they performed 
the target activity because it was enjoyable, or for "other 
reasons." Mean ratings are shown in Table 20, and a summary 
of the analysis in Table 21. There were no significant dif­
ferences on this item. 
Performance Data 
The performance measures of target activity value were 
consistent with the predictions. The mean number of inter­
vals in which subjects performed the target activity during 
Session 2 are shown in Table 22. Neither main effect was 
significant, but the interaction was significant at the 
£ <.01 level (see Table 23). In the Low Salience conditions 
the subjects tended to comply with the content of the "sub­
liminal message" with a mean of 15.78 for the Encourage con­
dition, and a mean of 4.56 in the Discourage group. A rever­
sal of this pattern occurred when the salience of constraint 
was High, with a mean of 3.67 for Encourage and a mean of 
8.33 for Discourage. Post-hoc tests indicate that value was 
significantly higher (]D <.05) in the Encourage-Low group, as 
compared with the Encourage-High and Discourage-Low condi­
tions. The mean of the Encourage-High condition was also 
significantly higher (jd <.05) than that of the Control group 
(M = 5.22). 
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The total intervals in which any of the three activ­
ities were performed during Session 2 were analyzed to 
determine if the previous results were specific to the target 
activity. The means are shown in Table 24, and a summary of 
the analysis in Table 25. While neither the main effects 
nor the interaction were statistically significant, the 
Subliminal x Salience interaction approached significance 
(F = 3.38, £ <.10). The pattern of total activity perform­
ance is very similar to the pattern found with target activ­
ity performance. Total performance is higher in the Encour­
age-Low group than in the Discourage-Low group, while the 
order is reversed for the High Salience conditions. 
Finally, the possibility of pretreatment differences 
was assessed by analyzing the performance of each activity 
during Session 1. Three separate one-way ANOVA's were run, 
with the results indicating no significant differences (all 
F's <1.15). 
The results of Experiment II support the prediction 
that compliance effects should occur when the salience of 
constraint is low, while oppositional behavior should occur 
when the salience of constraint is high. This finding is 
consistent with both reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) and cog­
nitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1981), which suggest 
that the perception of an attempt to control or constrain 
should be sufficient to produce oppositional behavior. It 
is possible that attempts at constraint will produce 
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oppositional behavior, even if the person does not believe 
that functional control was exercised. Indeed, the question­
naire data provide no support for the idea that any of the 
experimental groups believed their behavior to be under the 
control of the subception procedure. The verbal data pro­
vided no indication that subjects perceived that either 
their Session 1 performance or their attitudes were affected 
by the subliminal messages. While the role of functional 
control, as investigated in Experiment I, is unclear, Exper­
iment II suggests that attempted control is a critical 
variable in producing compliance or countercompliance. 
There is another possible interpretation of the results 
obtained thus far. Experiment II contains a conceptual 
confound. While the salience manipulation was designed as a 
way of manipulating the controlling aspect of the subception 
procedure, it is also possible that the affective context of 
subception was different in the two salience conditions. It 
is reasonable to assume that being subjected to a "mind-
control" procedure is more aversive then participating in a 
test of sensitivity to subtle auditory stimuli. If this is 
the case, then the counter-compliance effects obtained in the 
High Salience conditions may have been due to the aversive 
connotations of the subception procedure rather than the 
salience of constraint per se. 
This interpretation is consistent with Heider's (1958) 
cognitive balance theory of interpersonal relationships. 
\ 
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Balance theory, like other consistency theories, assumes 
that people are motivated to maintain harmony among related 
cognitions or beliefs. Consistency theories were developed 
in an attempt to identify a general construct of human moti­
vation in reaction to the inadequacies of drive-reduction. 
The brief discussion of balance theory that follows will 
focus on (1) the ways in which beliefs or cognitive elements 
may be related, (2) balanced and imbalanced relationships, 
and (3) means of reducing imbalance. 
According to balance theory, cognitive elements can be 
linked either by a unit relationship or a sentiment rela­
tionship. The concept of unit relationship is derived from 
Gestalt and field theories. Unit relationships are often 
a function of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus, percep­
tions about a man and his wife may be related because the 
pair are often seen together. In the same way, perceptions 
about Liberace and piano music may be related. Sentiment 
relationships take the form of liking or disliking. Atti­
tudes towards Ronald Reagan and defense spending are related 
because Reagan endorses military spending. Opinions about 
abortion and attitudes about the Pope are related because the 
Pope publicly disapproves of abortion. 
It is important to note that strictly logical relation­
ships between ideas or attitudes are not sufficient to 
produce balanced or imbalanced relationships. Many Ameri­
cans believe that freedom of speech is an inalienable right 
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of all Americans, and that American Communists should not 
be allowed the right of free speech. These two beliefs are 
logically inconsistent. However, psychological inconsis­
tency or imbalance will occur only if these beliefs are 
linked in some way. Imbalance would occur, for example, 
if the logical inconsistency was specifically pointed out to 
the individual. 
Balanced triads among sentiment relationships occur when 
there are three positive relationships or two negative rela­
tionships. An example of the first case would be: Jack 
likes Ronald Reagan, Jack likes the idea of increased 
defense spending,- and Reagan endorses increased defense 
spending. In this situation there is no stress for Jack to 
change his opinions about either Reagan or defense spending. 
Examples of the'double-negative balanced triad are as fol­
lows: (1) Jack dislikes Reagan and increased spending, while 
Reagan endorses defense spending. (2) Jack dislikes the Pope, 
the Pope dislikes abortion, and Jack endorses abortion. 
Again, there is no stress towards attitude change. 
Imbalance occurs when there is a single negative eval­
uation among three sentiment relationships. For example, if 
Jack likes Reagan, and Reagan endorses defense spending, 
and Jack dislikes military expenditure, then an imbalanced 
triad exists. Similarly, imbalance would occur if Jack dis­
likes Reagan, Reagan endorses defense spending, and Jack 
endorses military spending. In both of these situations, 
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imbalance can be redressed by escape or avoidance, compart-
mentalization, altering perceptions of others' sentiment 
relationships, or altering one's own sentiments. 
Escape or avoidance may be the simplest way to reduce 
the aversive consequences of imbalance. With regard to the 
previous example, Jack can quit thinking about Reagan and 
the defense budget? he can quit having lunch with friends 
who enjoy discussing politics; he can avoid reading the 
newspaper. A second tactic is compartmentalization: Jack 
can divorce his feelings about Reagan from his feelings 
about defense spending. Reagan's primary job is to promote 
the health of the domestic economy, which bears little rela­
tionship to the President's role as Commander-in-Chief. 
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Thus, Reagan's good or bad qualities vis-a-vis his principal 
role are unrelated to defense spending. A third way for 
Jack to reduce imbalance is to alter beliefs about Reagan's 
evaluation of defense spending. Reagan would really like to 
reduce military expenditures, but he is temporarily obligated 
to endorse defense spending as a means of facilitating party 
unity. Finally, Jack can alter his evaluations about either 
defense spending or Reagan, or both, to achieve greater bal­
ance . 
Balance theory makes no firm a priori predictions con­
cerning individual means of redressing imbalance, other than 
suggesting that the easiest or least costly method is most 
likely. Predictions within a particular situation, then, 
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must take into account the ease of avoiding conflict, the 
intensity and importance of particular sentiments to the 
individual, and so forth. In the typical laboratory inves­
tigation, the experimenter attenpts to induce inconsistency 
while deliberately restricting the available means of 
inconsistency reduction. Following our example, the exper­
imenter might first assess subjects' evaluations of Reagan 
and then expose subjects to a communication from Reagan. The 
communication might concern. Reagan's evaluation of the Irish 
Setter postage stamp. If an imbalance exists among the 
subject-Reagan-stamp triad, the experimenter might reason­
ably predict that attitudes toward the stamp would change. 
Escape is unlikely since the subject is usually committed to 
remaining in the setting for the duration of the experiment. 
The possibility of altering perceptions about Reagan's eval­
uation of the stamp could be minimized by using a communica­
tion from Reagan that is unequivocally either positive or 
negative towards the stamp. Compartmentalization has been 
empirically shown to be a rare means of reducing imbalance 
(Jordan, 1953). Assuming that sentiments towards Reagan are 
more intense (less easily changed) than are attitudes about 
stamp designs, then changing attitudes about the stamp is 
the most probable means of achieving balance. 
Balance theory can be used to interpret the results of 
both Experiments I and II if several assumptions are made. 
First, one must assume that there is a relationship between 
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the subjects' attitudes towards subception and attitudes 
toward the target activity. This is justified by the fact 
that the two are linked by the positive or negative sanc­
tions of the activity contained in the subliminal messages. 
Second, it is necessary to assume that the descriptions of 
subception and its typical uses resulted in either positive 
or negative evaluations of subception. In the High Salience 
conditions, Experiment II, subception was described as being 
used by unpleasant people for selfish ends, so that subcep­
tion should be negatively evaluated. In all other exper­
imental conditions in the two studies, subception was not 
presented in a negative context. Given that the experimenter 
was a respected authority figure, and that his use of subcep­
tion implied endorsement of the procedure, then subception 
should have been positively evaluated. The third assumption 
necessary for a balance interpretation is that any imbalance 
is likely to be redressed by changes in the value of the 
target activity. The other means of reducing imbalance are 
more costly or implausible. Escape from the situation is 
difficult since the subjects are committed to remaining in 
the experiment. Compartmentalization, as noted earlier, is 
infrequently used to achieve balance. Altering perceptions 
about the subliminal sanctions towards the activity would 
be difficult, since the subliminal messages are explicit and 
unambiguous in discouraging or encouraging target activity 
performance. Finally, altering the value of the target 
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activity involves little cost? no obvious standards or 
mores are threatened by doing so. 
If subception is positively evaluated, and subception 
endorses the target activity, then balance theory predicts a 
tendency towards increments in target activity value. This 
is a case of the triad in which balance is achieved by 
maintaining three positive sentiment relationships. If 
subception is positively evaluated and subception discourages 
target activity play, then balance is achieved by devaluing 
the activity. This is the triad in which balance is main­
tained by having two negative and one positive sentiment 
relationships. Thus, balance theory predicts that, when sub­
ception is positively evaluated, target activity value should 
shift towards compliance with the subliminal messages. This 
interpretation is consistent with the finding that compliance 
effects occurred in Experiment I and in the Low Salience 
conditions of Experiment II, in which subception is assumed 
to be positively evaluated. 
When subception is negatively evaluated, as is assumed 
for the High Salience conditions of the second study, balance 
can be achieved by having one and only one other negative 
sentiment relationship. If the subliminal message is neg­
ative towards the target activity, then the subjects' eval­
uation of the target activity should shift towards the 
positive. Conversely, if subception endorses the activity, 
then the activity should become more negatively evaluated. 
This would explain the finding that countercompliant 
evaluation of the target activity occurred in the High 
Salience conditions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT III 
Experiment III was designed to test a balance theory 
interpretation of Experiments I and II. This was done by 
manipulating the affective context of the subception pro­
cedure while maintaining the salience of constraint as a 
constant. As in the High Salience conditions, Experiment II, 
all subjects were told that subliminal perception was a mind-
control technique. In addition, they were told that previous 
research has clearly demonstrated that subception procedures 
have powerful control over attitudes and behavior. In the 
Positive conditions, an attempt was made to imbed this con­
trol technique within a positive affective context, such 
that the subjects would have a positive attitude towards sub­
ception. Subception was described as being typically used by 
psychologists for therapeutic purposes, to help people quit 
smoking, to build self-esteem, and the like. In the Negative 
conditions, subjects were told that subception was used by 
Communists as a means of brainwashing children, by cult mem­
bers to corrupt American youth, and so forth. Cognitive 
balance theory would predict that compliance should occur 
in the Positive conditions, and oppositional behavior in the 
Negative conditions. 
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Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) can be used to derive 
different predictions. According to reactance theory, the 
occurrence of oppositional behavior is a function of the 
degree of constraint or threat of constraint. The source of 
constraint, whether positively or negatively evaluated, is 
not critical to the degree of reactance arousal. Thus, 
reactance theory would predict that oppositional behavior 
would occur in both the Positive and Negative contexts. 
Before describing the procedures of Experiment III, a 
comment on the relationship of affect and constraint is 
appropriate. This study attempts to vary affective context 
while holding the degree of attempted constraint constant. 
In fact, it is probably impossible to completely separate 
affect and constraint. Malicious agents of social influence 
may be perceived as more controlling than benign agents, 
regardless of experimental manipulations. Nonetheless, 
ackn'owledging that a factorial separation of constraint and 
affect is difficult, Experiment III is presented as an 
approximation of that goal. 
Method 
Experiment III differed from the previous experiments 
(I and II) in that no attempt was made to manipulate salience 
of control as an independent variable. Rather, an effort 
was made to produce a high perception of attempted control 
in all experimental conditions, as was the case with the 
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High Salience conditions in Experiment II. In the present 
study, subliminal perception was described as being either 
typically used for benign or therapeutic purposes (Positive 
Context), or typically used for socially undesirable pur­
poses (Negative Context). The equipment, location, activ­
ities, experimenter, and dependent measures were the same 
as those reported in the previous studies. 
/ 
Subjects 
The subjects were 75 women recruited from introductory 
psychology courses at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. They ranged in age from 17 to 48 years. All of 
the students received course credit for participating in the 
study. The subjects were randomly assigned to the five con­
ditions , with the stipulation that each condition would have 
an equal number of subjects. 
Procedure 
Sessions 1 and 2 were conducted in the same way as in 
Experiments I and II. At the end of Session 1, half of the 
experimental subjects were told that they had been exposed 
to the Encourage subliminal messages, while the remainder 
were told that they had heard Discourage messages. All the 
subjects were told that subliminal perception is a very power­
ful means of producing attitude change. (See Appendix E, 
Instructions, Experiment III.) The Subliminal message 
variable was crossed with the Affective Context factor 
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(Positive or Negative). In the Positive Context, subjects 
were told that benign psychologists typically use subliminal 
perception for the benefit of the recipients. In the Neg­
ative Context, subliminal persuasion was described as a means 
of producing socially undesirable effects for the selfish 
gain of the communicator. None of the participants received 
any GSR feedback. The procedures for the control condition 
were the same as in Experiments I and II. 
Results and Discussion 
Three subjects were deleted from the data analysis. 
Two of the subjects failed to sample all three activities 
during Session 1 as requested. The experimenter made a pro­
cedural error while running the third subject. Three addi­
tional subjects were run so that there were 15 in each con­
dition . 
Verbal Data 
Two of the questionnaire items (Q4a, Q8a) asked if the 
music contained subliminal messages. Eighty-five percent of 
the subjects in the experimental groups answered "Yes" to 
these items. Ninety-four percent of those subjects correctly 
recalled the content of the "subliminal" message. 
One questionnaire item (Q8b) asked the subjects to report 
the extent to which the subliminal messages affected their 
attitudes towards the experimental activities. The mean 
responses to this item are shown in Table 26. There were no 
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significant differences among the experimental groups 
(Table 27). The overall mean response for all experimental 
groups was 3.64, only slightly higher than the overall mean 
for Experiment II (2.78) and the No Feedback mean in Exper­
iment I (3.15). 
On Q5 subjects were asked to estimate the amount of time 
spent on the target activity during Session 1. The mean per­
centage estimates are shown in Table 28. As seen in Table 29, 
there were no significant differences on this item, although 
the Subliminal x Affect interaction approached significance 
(g <.10). There is a trend such that subjects in the Posi­
tive context acknowledged that their performance was consis­
tent with the content of the subliminal message, while the 
estimates in the Negative conditions were very similar to 
the Control group estimates. 
Another question (Q12) was included as a check on the 
interest value of the experimental activities. The mean 
rating, across all conditions, was 7.44 on a 1-9 scale. 
This was comparable to the mean ratings obtained in the two 
previous studies, again indicating that the activities were 
interesting. There were no significant differences on 
this item. 
As in the previous experiments, questionnaire ratings 
for "enjoyment" and "interest" in the target activity were 
summed to obtain a verbal measure of value (Q1 + Q9). The 
means are shown in Table 30 and a summary of the analysis in 
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Table 31. While neither main effect was significant, the 
Subliminal x Affect interaction was significant at £<.05. 
Post-hoc analyses yield no significant differences among 
experimental conditions, nor between the Control group and 
any experimental condition. Inspection of the means reveals 
a trend towards compliance in the Positive conditions, and a 
trend towards countercompliance in the Negative conditions. 
Q13 asked the subjects about locus of causality for 
performing the target activity on a 1 ("enjoyable") to 9 
("other reasons") scale. Mean ratings on this item are shown 
in Table 32. As can be seen in Table 33, the Subliminal x 
Affect interaction is statistically significant (£<".05). 
Post-hoc tests reveal no significant cell-to-cell compari­
sons , either within experimental conditions or between exper­
imental conditions and the Control group. In the Positive 
conditions, the Encourage group performance was attributable 
to the "enjoyment" of the target activity, while the Dis­
courage group ratings shifted towards "other reasons" as the 
motivating factor. This pattern was reversed in the Negative 
conditions. A comparison of these means with the figures in 
Table 30, the verbal ratings of value, indicates a very 
similar pattern of responding. The most parsimonious expla­
nation is that both sets of items assessed the same variable— 
the extent to which subjects enjoyed the target activity. 
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Performance Data 
The primary dependent measure, the number of intervals 
in which subjects performed the target activity during 
Session 2, is summarized in Tables 34 and 35. While neither 
main effect was significant, the Subliminal x Affect manip­
ulation was significant (£<.025). Post-hoc analyses yielded 
no significant cell-to-cell comparisons, either within the 
experimental conditions or between the Control group and any 
experimental conditions. The pattern of the interaction, 
however, is consistent with predictions derived from cogni­
tive balance theory. In the Positive conditions, subjects 
tended to comply with the sanctions of the "subliminal mes­
sage." Countercompliance effects are seen in the Negative 
conditions. This interaction occurred even though subjects 
in all experimental groups were told that subception was a 
powerful means of controlling attitudes and behavior. Reac­
tance theory, which would predict countercompliance in both 
the Positive and Negative contexts, was not supported. As 
stated previously, this reactance theory prediction rests on 
the assumption that evaluative factors can be varied inde­
pendent of threatened constraint. 
As in the previous studies, an analysis was run on the 
total intervals in which any of the target activities were 
performed during Session 2 (see Tables 36 and 37). There 
were no significant differences, indicating that the effects 
of the independent variables were specific to the target 
activities. 
106 
The possibility of pretreatment differences was checked 
by analyzing the performance of each experimental activity 
during Session 1. Three separate ANOVA's were calculated, 
with no indications of baseline differences (all F's<1.40). 
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
There were three purposes for conducting the initial 
study in this investigation: (1) to determine if target 
activity value change could occur in an overjustification 
paradigm when performance-mediation effects were ruled out 
methodologically, (2) to determine if an inhibitory extrin­
sic "cause" would have opposite and complementary effects 
relative to a facilitating "cause," and (3) to investigate 
the role of control or constraint in an overjustification 
paradigm. 
The present experiments clearly indicate that value 
change can occur in an overjustification procedure in the 
absence of performance-mediation effects. In each of the 
three studies the subception manipulation affected post-
treatment performance. It could be argued, of course, that 
performance-mediated effects did occur, and were functionally 
related to the value shifts. Delayed performance effects 
(distraction, hurried performance, perseveration of response 
sequencing, etc.) could have differentially affected per­
formance in the second session of the experiments. This 
criticism, however, is unavoidable, since the test for value 
shifts involves performing the target activities. 
In terms of the second issue, it is fairly clear that 
the introduction of an inhibitory cause (the Discourage 
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subliminal message) had a complementary effect on value 
with respect to the facilitating cause (the Encourage sub­
liminal procedure). In both Experiments II and III, when 
the Encourage procedure produced value increments relative 
to the controls, the Discourage procedure produced value dec­
rements relative to the controls. Similarly, when the 
Encourage procedure produced value decrements, the Discour­
age procedure led to value increments. While some of the 
pairwise cell comparisons described above were not statis­
tically significant in post-hoc tests, the pattern of the 
results is consistent in both studies. 
Another paper reporting augmenting effects was recently 
published by Wilson and Lassiter (1982). In two studies, 
free access to an activity was restricted, followed by a 
test session in which the target activity was freely avail­
able. In the first study, preschoolers were restricted from 
playing with a certain toy. Posttreatment free-play perform­
ance of the target activity was greater for these children 
relative to a control group that had not been constrained. 
In a second experiment, college students were administered a 
trivia quiz under conditions which provided ample opportun­
ity to cheat. One group was given a severe warning against 
cheating, another group received a mild warning, and a con­
trol group was not warned at all. In a posttreatment test 
session, cheating increased as a linear function of severity 
of threat. 
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There are two differences between the augmenting 
effects found in the present studies and the results of 
Wilson and Lassiter. First, the constraint procedure in 
Wilson and Lassiter's first study actually restricted free 
access; children were prevented from playing with the target 
toy. In the present studies, any perception of constraint 
was a misattribution, in that there were indeed no subliminal 
messages. The present investigation thus indicates that 
actual constraint is not a necessary precondition for augment­
ing effects. A second difference is that, in the present 
studies, the target activities were selected to be attrac­
tive, while Wilson and Lassiter deliberately selected 
unattractive target activities. While Wilson and Lassiter 
did not state that low initial value is a necessary antecedent 
of augmenting effects, they strongly suggested that low value 
is a critical factor. The present experiments indicate that 
this is not the case. 
The third purpose of this series of studies was to 
investigate the role of the retrospective misattribution of 
constraint in value shifts. Experiment I provided no support 
for the prediction that perceived control would generate 
choice shifts in opposition to the direction of control. 
Even when given explicit information that functional control 
had occurred (Effective GSR feedback), subjects did not per­
form in a countercompliant manner during the test session. 
The verbal data indicated that subjects in the Effective GSR 
V 
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feedback conditions believed that the subception procedure 
exercised control over physiological attitude measures. 
However, it may be the case that a strong perception of 
extrinsic causality may not have been established. First, 
subjects may have simply been repeating the feedback instruc­
tions on the questionnaire in order to please the exper­
imenter. This notion is supported by the fact that in Exper­
iments II and III, where no GSR feedback was given, there 
were no compelling verbal data that indicated that any group 
perceived the subception as exercising strong control. 
Second, informal discussions with subjects after the exper­
iment revealed an egocentric bias with regard to inferring 
causality. Many of the subjects were quite willing to acknow­
ledge that subception could be effective with people in 
general, but extremely dubious about the idea of such a 
subtle procedure exercising control over their own prefer­
ences . Other subjects expressed an informal conviction 
that, as a general rule, people are aware of the causes of 
their own behavior. Some of these subjects were incredulous 
that a stimulus whose existence was not evident could pos­
sibly affect behavior. 
Unfortunately, clear-cut conclusions from Experiment I 
are not possible. It may be the case that (1) the percep­
tion of external constraint was not successfully induced by 
the GSR feedback procedure, or that (2) perceived control 
was achieved but did not have the expected effects on 
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performance. This conclusion, of course, exemplifies one of 
the major weaknesses of use of attributions as mediating 
variables (Bern, 1972; Fiedler, 1982; Reiss & Sushinsky, 
1976). Given unexpected results, we can't know if the 
theory was incorrect, or the appropriate attribution did not 
occur. This state of affairs is complicated by the fact 
that there is no particular reason to believe that either 
the process or outcome of naive attributional analysis is 
available to introspection (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). 
While the role of perceived constraint is unclear, the 
present investigation shows that attempted constraint is an 
important variable. Experiments II and III indicate that 
countercompliance is most likely to occur when salience 
of attempted'control is high, and when the control procedure 
is associated with negatively valued social agents. The data 
from the Positive context conditions, Experiment III, indi­
cates that salience of attempted control is not a sufficient 
antecedent of countercompliance. When the constraint pro­
cedure was described as typically used by good agents for 
the benefit of mankind, compliance effects were obtained. 
The results of the three experiments can be accounted 
for using cognitive balance theory (Heider, 1958). According 
to balance theory, compliance or countercompliance (with 
instructions, reward contingencies, etc.) will be partially 
determined by the context of interpersonal relations. If 
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the method of control is positively valenced, compliance 
is likely to occur. Conversely, countercompliance effects 
should be seen with negatively valenced means of control. 
In Experiment I, compliance occurred independent of feed­
back designed to vary the salience of functional constraint. 
This is consistent with cognitive balance theory if we 
assume that subception was positively valued. In Experi­
ments II and III, compliance effects resulted when the 
constraint procedure was described as either a test of 
sensitivity or a therapeutic tool. Only when subception was 
described as being used by dubious characters for selfish 
purposes were countercompliance effects obtained. 
Other studies have found evidence of cognitive balance 
effects on value as a function of the imposition of con­
straints. Seta and Carstens (Note 4) investigated the inter­
action of sanctions and affective context with preschool 
children. First, all the children were shown an attractive 
target toy. Half of the children were told that they would 
be allowed to play with the toy, and half were told that they 
would not. Then the children had either a positive or nega­
tive interaction with the experimenter. In the positive 
conditions, the subjects watched an interesting cartoon film, 
during which the experimenter interacted with the subjects. 
Children in the negative conditions watched a boring film 
(senators discussing politics) while being ignored by the 
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experimenter. Finally, a second experimenter allowed the 
children to play with the target toy and three other toys in 
a free play setting. There was a significant Sanction x 
Context interaction for target activity performance. Fol­
lowing the Positive context, the children complied with the 
sanctions of the first experimenter (Can play> Cannot play). 
The opposite effect occurred following the negative context, 
with more target activity performance in the Cannot play 
condition. 
Worchel and Arnold (1973) investigated compliance and 
countercompliance in the context of constraints imposed by 
censorship. Adult subjects were told that they either would 
or would not be allowed to hear a particular communication. 
The subjects were told that free access to the communication 
had been threatened by either a positively or negatively 
valenced censor. Then, with no subjects ever actually hear­
ing the censored message, Worchel and Arnold assessed (1) the 
subjects' desire to hear the communication, and (2) the sub­
jects' attitudes towards the topic of the communication. 
In terms of desire to hear the censored message, the 
data were consistent with reactance rather than balance 
theory. Subjects who had been told that they could not hear 
the communication rated a stronger desire than did subjects 
who expected to subsequently hear the communication. This 
effect occurred for both Positive and Negative censors. The 
data on attitudes towards the topic of the communication 
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indicated the operation of both reactance and balance pro­
cesses. There was a significant main effect for Expectation, 
with subjects who expected not to hear the message shifting 
their attitudes away from those of the censor, as would be 
predicted by reactance theory. There was also an interac­
tion, such that subjects in the Positive-Expect-to-hear group 
shifted attitudes towards the censor. When the censor was 
described as a positive agent of social control, subjects 
who could overcome the censor (they would eventually hear 
the communication) complied with the censor's position. 
Experiments II and III of the present investigation are 
comparable to the Expect-to-hear conditions of Worchel and 
Arnold. In the expect-to-hear groups, the constraint was 
rather mild, given that the attempted censorship would even­
tually be overruled. Similarly, any perceived constraint 
imposed by the subception procedure was not sufficient to 
totally deny access to the activities, since all subjects 
sampled all three activities during Session 1. The results 
of the present investigation and the findings of Worchel and 
Arnold would suggest a tentative speculation about the con­
ditions under which reactance or balance effects will occur. 
If the constraint manipulation comprises an impassable bar­
rier, then countercompliance should occur, regardless of the 
valence of the agents of control. If the constraint is 
weaker, or perhaps seen as ineffective, cognitive balance 
theory may provide better predictions. Under these 
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circumstances countercompliance should be expected with 
negative controlling agents, while compliance effects should 
occur with positively valenced agents. 
The cognitive balance theory interpretation suggests 
that further attention should be paid to interpersonal rela­
tionship factors in the study of overjustification effects. 
In particular, the individuals' attitude towards the agent 
of social influence, and towards the sponsoring institution, 
should influence the magnitude and direction of value shifts. 
Cognitive Balance Theory and Attribution Theory 
It has been argued that the results of the present inves 
tigation are more nearly consistent with balance theory than 
with attribution theory. Kelley (1973), however, has pro­
vided a model which incorporates both discounting and bal­
ance processes within an attributional framework. Accord­
ing to Kelley, there are a number of different causal sche­
mata that are used to infer causality. These schemata, or 
a priori causal theories (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), are concep­
tualized as cognitive structures that exist before exposure 
to the events that are to be explained (Bartlett, 1932). 
The immediate circumstances, plus the cultural and develop­
mental history of the individual, determine which schemata 
will be used to account for which events. For example, there 
is the multiple sufficient causal (MSC) schema, in which a 
single cause is chosen from among a set of potential causes 
to explain some event. Another hypothesized structure is 
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the multiple necessary causal (MNC) schema, in which at 
least two causes must be inferred in order to provide a 
satisfactory explanation. 
As a general rule, simple schemata are preferred over 
more complex ones (Cunningham & Kelley, 1975; Kanouse, 1971). 
According to Kelley (1973), both discounting and cognitive 
balance can be viewed as simple schemata. The use of a dis­
counting (or augmenting) schema presupposes that a single 
cause is sufficient to account for a particular event. A 
more sophisticated causal analytic approach would consider 
interactions among a number of potential causes. The use of 
a balance schema is also fairly simple, in that evaluative 
factors intrude into the inference process. In formal dis­
course, the use of balance "reasoning" is called an ad hom-
inem argument, and is considered unacceptable. 
Nisbett and Ross (1980) have suggested a number of 
reasons why the typical overjustification procedure should 
encourage the use of simple schemata such as discounting or 
balancing. First, the event to be explained (performing the 
target activity) is fairly mundane. The subject is asked 
to perform an activity, usually with a cover story that is 
designed to fit the subject's expectations about what goes on 
in a psychology experiment. Mundane events tend to evoke 
simple schemata, while more complex schemata tend to be 
reserved for explaining unusual or extreme events (Cunningham 
& Kelley, 1975). Second, the subject is not aware that his 
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or her attributional capabilities are the focus of the 
study; hence,there is little motivation to impress the 
experimenter with inferential complexity. Third, the event 
to be explained is probably not very important to the subject. 
We would not expect the individual to invest a great deal 
of time and energy towards analyzing the cause of perform­
ance. Fourth, the situation is typically structured in such 
a way as to evoke simple schemata. The incentive is made 
as salient as possible, while the potential for the percep­
tion of other extrinsic causal factors is minimized. Fin­
ally, and most important, the subject has a limited amount 
of information as input for a causal analysis. Since the 
subject is run individually, he or she cannot compare per­
formance with that of other subjects. Nor can the indi­
vidual conduct any kind of informal analysis of the covaria­
tion of responding under various incentive conditions, since 
a single treatment is given to a particular subject. 
Given the parameters of the typical overjustification 
experiment, we should expect to see evidence of the use of 
simple causal schemata. The fact that the present investi­
gation produced results consistent with balance theory rather 
than discounting may be due to salience factors in the 
retrospective misattribution procedure. In the typical 
overjustification study the subject is led, prior to initiat­
ing performance, into perceiving some extrinsic factor as a 
sufficient cause of performance. In the present experiments, 
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however, the salience of the extrinsic "cause" (subception) 
was considerably reduced by delaying the manipulation until 
the treatment session was completed. In addition, the 
affective component, manipulated by descriptions of typical 
uses of subception, was made very salient by the experi­
menter's deliberately vivid descriptions. Thus, the rela­
tively greater salience of the affective component produced 
results consistent with cognitive balance theory. 
Problems with Schemata Interpretations 
The major.problem with attributional explanations of 
performance"is circularity or tautology (Bern, 1972). The 
fact that performance effects occur as if they were mediated 
by a particular schema does not establish either the exis­
tence of the schema or its operation in the particular 
circumstances. Fiedler (1982) points out that the logic of 
validating the mediating variable in this way could lead, 
ad absurdum, to the postulation of an analogy schema for 
the solution of analogies, an abstraction schema for doing 
abstract problems, etc. An obvious solution would be to 
provide independent evidence for the existence of the 
mediating variable. Unfortunately, this has proven to be 
very difficult within the attributional literature. 
In both the overjustification and insufficient justifi­
cation literatures (e.g., Collins & Hoyt, 1972; Cooper, 1971), 
researchers typically attempt to independently assess the 
cognitive processes that presumably mediate value shifts. 
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This is done with structured questionnaires and with more 
informal postexperimental interviews. The results are quite 
consistent: it is much easier to obtain evidence of the 
value shifts than it is to obtain verbal data indicative of 
the operation of mediating attributions (Bern, 1972; Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977). This holds true even when subjects are 
given the outcome of the study, the experimental hypotheses, 
and a theoretical explanation of the attributional account 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The present investigation is con­
sistent with the literature in that there are no independent 
data validating the notion of causal schemata as mediators 
of value'shifts. 
Nisbett and his associates (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nis­
bett & Wilson, 1977) argue that the lack of independent val­
idation of mediating attributions simply reflects the limits 
of introspection. Not only are people unaware of the opera­
tion of cognitive processes, they are also often unaware of 
the outcomes of those processes. If this is the case, then 
we need not be overly embarrassed when our subjects provide 
us with no independent evidence of the operation of schemata. 
Others, however, have objected strenuously to such theoriz­
ing (e.g., Bern, 1972). Bern suggests that the use of uncon­
scious mediating variables must lead to the kinds of excesses 
seen in psychodynamic theories, in which all things are 
explicable after the fact. Given this serious problem, 
attributional approaches to social psychological phenomena 
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cannot be justified so much by precision and testability 
as by heuristic value (Fiedler, 1982) and by the impor­
tance of focusing attention on the inferential capabilities 
of the average person (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Ross, 
1977). 
Another problem with attributional explanations of 
performance involves the link between the mediating variable 
a'nd the dependent variable (Bern, 1972). Assuming that some 
procedure results in a discounting of intrinsic motivation, 
how does that translate into a subsequent performance dec­
rement? A related problem concerns the relationship between 
dependent measures that are theoretically mediated by the 
same cognitive processes. If verbal ratings and performance 
measures are both assumed to be indicative of value, and if 
value is mediated by a common set of attributional processes, 
then one would expect to see a strong relationship between 
the two dependent variables. Verbal and performance measures 
did not covary consistently in the present investigation. 
Only in Experiment III were the verbal and performance 
measures consistent. Other overjustification studies 
(e.g., Arnold, 1976; Farr, Vance, & Mclntyre, 1977; Fisher, 
1978; Ryan, 1982) have also found inconsistent results in 
verbal and performance measures of value. 
Scripts 
An alternative to the schemata interpretation of the 
present investigation can be based on the notion of "scripts" 
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(Schank & Abelson, 1977). The script concept employs a 
dramatic metaphor, in which persons are viewed as actors on 
various stages. The diversity of social interaction situa­
tions is subsumed under a set of scripts, each with its own 
stock personae with predictable roles. An individual, upon 
entering a social situation, identifies the script and his 
or her role on the basis of a limited set of cues. Once the 
individual assumes a particular role, he or she carries out 
the behaviors associated with that role in a somewhat "mind­
less" fashion (Langer, 1978). For example, a student enter­
ing a lecture course may assume that it's the instructor's 
role to say boring things, and the student's role to write 
them down. The instructor's attempts to encourage the stu­
dent to take a more active role may be unsuccessful because 
it violates the standard script. 
Kelley's attribution theory and the script model differ 
in terms of the emphasis placed upon the individual as an 
information processor. Kelley's "lay scientist" continually 
collects data, estimates covariations, and compares rival 
causal hypotheses. The script-actor is a simpler soul; once 
the proper script and role have been identified, very little 
causal analysis occurs. 
A script approach to the results of the present investi­
gation would involve adherence to a simple set of rules. 
It's a good thing to comply with authority figures, unless 
those figures are associated with wrongdoing. In that case, 
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countercompliance is a good thing. This interpretation is 
consistent with the finding that countercompliance occurred 
only when the typical user of subception was described as a 
brainwasher. The script approach deemphasizes the search 
for controlling variables and the impact of perceived con­
straint on subsequent value. Simply being in a situation 
where attempts at constraint are made, coupled with the pur­
poses of the controlling agent, will dictate compliance or 
countercompliance. Thus the perceived constraint manipula­
tion in Experiment I was ineffective in producing counter-
compliance . 
Control and Attempted Control 
According to the attributional and self-perception 
analyses, the degree to which subjects perceive the reward 
as controlling performance is a critical determinant of over-
justification effects. An external attribution of sufficient 
cause, accompanied by a decrease in perceived intrinsic moti­
vation, is a necessary antecedent of overjustification 
effects. The results of the present studies do not provide 
strong support for this position. In Experiment I, an 
attempt was made to manipulate perceived constraint in a 
direct fashion. Subjects were told that the subception 
procedure either did or did not exercise control over a 
physiological index of preference. Questionnaire results 
indicated that the subjects may have believed the false 
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physiological feedback. Nonetheless, overjustification or 
countercompliance effects did not occur in Experiment I. 
In Experiments II and III, countercompliance effects 
occurred only when there was a strong manipulative attempt 
coupled with negative connotations. However, the question­
naire data provided no indication that the subjects in these 
studies believed that the subception procedure exercised 
functional control. In addition, informal discussions with 
the subjects yielded no compelling evidence that they believed 
that functional control occurred. 
While a number of studies have been cited as supporting 
the notion of perceived constraint as an antecedent to over-
justification effects, a reexamination of the literature shows 
that this is not necessarily so. For example, several 
studies have found that surveillance, while performing a 
target activity, reduces subsequent interest in the task 
(Lepper & Greene, 1975; Pittmann, Davey, Alafort, Wetherill, 
& Kramer, 1980). These results have been interpreted as 
evidence that the audience induces perceptions of constraint, 
which reduces intrinsic motivation. None of these exper­
iments, however, provides any independent measures indicat­
ing that subjects under surveillance perceived any constraint. 
Ryan (1982) and Pittmann et al. (1980) found that controlling 
feedback (e.g., "you're doing fine, just as you ought to") 
reduced subsequent intrinsic interest relative to informa­
tional feedback ("you're doing fine"). Again, neither study 
124 
included any independent data suggesting that the controlling 
feedback increased perceptions of constraint. Fisher (1978) 
manipulated the type of payment schedule in an attempt to 
alter perceived control. The two payment conditions dif­
fered significantly on verbal ratings of perceived constraint, 
but verbal measures of intrinsic motivation were not affected. 
Karniol and Ross (1979) reported data indicating that 
the salience of manipulative intent can produce "discount­
ing" effects even in subjects who make minimal use of a dis­
counting schema. Karniol and Ross selected subjects by 
pretesting kindergarten children for discounting ability. 
The children listened to two stories in which an actor per­
formed a particular activity. In one story the actor per­
formed in the presence of social influence, while in the 
other story the actor was unconstrained. The children were 
then asked which actor liked the target activity best. 
Discounters were defined as children who selected the uncon­
strained actor, and children who selected the constrained 
actor were defined as additive. 
In the experiment proper, only children who failed to 
demonstrate the use of discounting were selected as subjects. 
All the subjects were shown a film in which an agent rewarded 
another person for playing with a target toy. In the manip­
ulative condition, the agent explained that the purpose of 
the reward procedure was to constrain behavior. In the 
nonmanipulative condition, the agent explained that she was 
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being nice and wanted the person to have a reward. All sub­
jects were exposed to both film conditions, and then asked 
to decide which actor had liked the toy best. A signif­
icantly higher proportion of children inferred greater 
intrinsic motivation in the nonmanipulative than in the manip 
ulative condition, even though the children had previously 
failed to show evidence of discounting. 
The overjustification literature shows that attempted 
constraint, not perceived constraint, is an antecedent of 
countercompliance effects. It may be the case that counter-
compliance is most likely to occur when social influence 
attempts are salient, but the individual perceives the 
attempts as being ineffective. There are numerous situa­
tions in which we find ourselves under the influence of other 
people. A blind tendency to react oppositionally to all 
forms of constraint would lead to condemnation from a variety 
of social institutions. It is reasonable to assume that 
countercompliance is a selective phenomenon, i.e., that it 
tends to occur when oppositional behavior is unlikely to be 
punished. This would happen when the attempts at constraint 
are seen as weak or totally ineffective. In any case, fur­
ther research on this point is warranted, especially in 
light of the fact that there is no compelling evidence that 
perceived constraint is associated with overjustification 
or countercompliance effects. 
126 
Summary and Conclusions 
Overjustification effects have been explained in terms 
of the changes in locus of causality that occur when an 
interesting activity is performed under some extrinsic 
incentive condition. Alternative explanations assign a 
critical role to the differences in treatment-session per­
formance that occur with and without incentives. In the 
present series of investigations, a method was used in an 
attempt to systematically alter locus of causality while 
ruling out the possibility of differential treatment-session 
performance effects. This was done by using a bogus sublim­
inal perception procedure, in which subjects were told after 
the treatment session that they had been subjected to subtle 
influence communications. In fact, no such communications 
occurred during the treatment session, so that differential 
performance effects could not occur. 
The results indicated that overjustification effects 
(countercompliant behavior) occurred when the salience of 
attempted constraint was high, coupled with negative inten­
tions on the part of the typical controlling agency. Sal­
ient attempts at constraint in a positive context did not 
produce countercompliance. Likewise, feedback indicating 
functional constraint was not sufficient to produce counter-
compliance. These findings were interpreted as being con­
sistent with cognitive balance theory. The results suggest 
that more attention should be paid to the impact of the 
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interpersonal relationship context of attempted control in 
overjustification effects. In addition, research should be 
directed towards examining the contributions of attempted 
constraint versus perceived constraint in overjustification 
effects. 
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Footnotes 
"'"Catania (1973) also proposed an analysis in which 
reinforcement has both excitatory and inhibitory effects. 
2 Behavioral and incentive contrast refer to situations 
in which there is an interaction between a given condition 
of reinforcement and other contemporary or previous condi­
tions of reinforcement. Between-subjects investigations are 
typically labeled as incentive contrast, while behavioral 
contrast refers to within-subjects methodology (Dunham, 
1968). 
O 
Reinforcement refers to an increase m the frequency 
and/or duration of performance of a target activity due to a 
multiple reward procedure, while incentive effects refer to 
the same kinds of behavior changes in a single reward pro­
cedure. 
4 Lack of uniformity in the description of contingency 
procedures in the overjustification literature has led to 
some confusion (Condry, 1977). In this paper the following 
terms are used: 
Piece-rate payment refers to a reward schedule in which 
a specified amount of reward is given per specified produc­
tion unit. 
Participation payment requires the subject to engage in 
the task for some period of time in order to receive payment. 
Minimum performance is a participation schedule with a 
minimum criterion necessary for payment. 
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A wait-contingency simply requires the subject to be in 
the experimental situation for a certain amount of time in 
order for payment to occur. 
5 
Several of the questionnaire items were filler items. 
Responses to these questions are not included for this 
experiment or for subsequent experiments. 
6 
For post-hoc comparisons within the factorial design, 
Tukey HSD contrasts were used. The error term for the 
Control group was not included in the Tukey HSD calculations. 
For comparisons between the Control condition and exper­
imental conditions, the Dunnett's test was used. The error 
term was obtained by doing a one-way ANOVA on all conditions, 
including the Control (Himmelfarb, 1975). All post-hoc tests 
were two-tailed. The alpha level was set at £ <.05, unless 
otherwise specified. These procedures were followed for 
Experiments II and III. 
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Name A ge S ex Da t e 
Time Exp. _Code 
SESSION 1 
1. M G S 9. M G S 17. M G s 25. M G S 
2. M G S 10. M G s 18. M G s 26. M G S 
3. M G S 11. M G s 19. M G s 27. M G S 
4. M G S 12. M G s 20. M G s 28. M G S 
5. M G S 13. M G s 21. M G s 29. M G s 
6. M G S 14. M G s 22. M G s 30. M G s 
7. M G S 15. M G s 23. M G s 31. M G s 
8. M G S 16. M G s 24. M G s 32. M G s 
Totals: M G S Sum = Target 
= 
SESSION 2 
1. M G S 9. M G S 17. M G S 25. M G S 
2. M G S • 
o
 
1—1 
M G S 00
 
• M G S 26. M G S 
3. M G S 11. M G S 19. M G S 27. M G s 
4. M G S • 
C
M
 •—
1 
M G S 20. M G s 28. M G s 
5. M G S 13. M G s 21. M G s 29. M G s 
6. M G S 14. M G s 22. M G s 30. M G s 
7. M G s 15. M G s 23. M G s 31. M G s 
8. M G s 16. M G s 24. M G s 32. M G s 
Totals: M G 2 Sum := 
Duration Target = 
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Name 
1. How much did you enjoy each of the following activities? 
Please circle the number best corresponding to your opinion: 
Maze 123456789 
Gravitation 123456789 
Simon 123456789 
Not at all Very much 
2. How challenging did you find each of the following activ­
ities? 
Maze .1 23456789 
Gravitation 123456789 
Simon 123456789 
Not at all Very much 
3. How competent were you at each of the following activities? 
Maze 123456789 
Gravitation 123456789 
Simon 123456789 
Not at all Very much 
4. Did the music contain a hidden message? If so, 
what was the content of that message? 
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5. During the time that your psychogalvanic response was 
being measured, what percent of the 10-minute session did you 
spend with each of the following activities? 
Maze % 
Gravitation % 
Simon % 
6. Did the experimenter give you any feedback as to your 
psychogalvanic response measures? If so, what was 
the content of that feedback? 
7. Do you feel that the psychogalvanic response measures 
provided an accurate index of your true attitudes towards 
the activities? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all " Very much 
8. Did the music contain a hidden message? If so, 
do you feel that the message affected your attitudes towards 
the activities? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all Very much 
9. How interesting were each of the following activities? 
Maze 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Gravitation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Simon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all Very much 
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10. How much did you enjoy participating in this exper­
iment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all Very much 
11. Would you be willing to volunteer to participate in a 
very similar experiment in the future? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all Very much 
12. Did you find the activities, on the whole, to be 
interesting? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all Very much 
13. Did you perform the following activities because they 
were enjoyable, or because of other reasons? 
Maze 123456789 
Gravitation 123456789 
S imon 123456789 
Enjoyable Other reasons 
Thank you. 
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[Experimenter escorts subject to the lab room, engages in a 
"warm-up" chat for approximately 1 minute 
ALL CONDITIONS: 
"Let me explain what we'll be doing here today. We 
are interested in getting measures of your preference, in 
terms of both attitudes and physiological responding, for a 
number of experimental activities. I'm going to ask you to 
try out a few activities for about 8 minutes. During that 
time, I'11 be recording your psychogalvanic skin response by 
means of these electrodes (indicate) which are attached to 
this apparatus (indicate). The psychogalvanic skin response 
provides a physiological measure of momentary changes in 
arousal and emotion. Following this 8-minute period, I'll 
ask you to fill out a questionnaire concerning your attitudes 
towards the experimental activities. Do you have any ques­
tions so far?" 
[Experimenter explains that participation is voluntary, 
and that the subject is free to withdraw at any time. The 
subject signs a consent form.] 
"OK, we're ready to go. First let me demonstrate these 
activities. [Experimenter demonstrates the use of the 
3 games, then attaches the GSR electrodes to the subject's 
left wrist.J "What I'd like you to do is very simple. For 
the next 8 minutes, I'd like you to try out these 3 activities, 
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You may try them as little or as long as you like, and in 
any order that you like. I would like you to try each activ­
ity at least once. While you're doing that, I'll be over 
here (indicate) monitoring your psychogalvanic skin response. 
Again, the psychogalvanic skin response provides a physiolog­
ical measure of your true feelings towards the activities. 
At the end of 8 minutes, I'll give you a questionnaire about 
your opinions of the activities. Any questions? While we're 
doing this I'm going to play some music. [Experimenter cuts 
on music, Session 1 begins.] 
[After 8 minutes, the experimenter stops the music and 
removes the GSR electrodes.] 
CONTROL GROUP: "OK, that's fine. As I said, I want to give 
you a questionnaire. I need to run down the hall and get 
the questionnaire, and I also need to check in with another 
person who's working on something else. I'll be back as 
quick as I can, in just a few minutes. You can play with 
the games if you like." 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS: 
"OK, that's fine. Now I can explain to you fully what 
this experiment was about. Have you ever heard of persuasion 
through hidden messages? In subliminal perception, a message 
is delivered directly to the unconscious mind, below the 
level of conscious awareness. You may have heard, for exam­
ple, of movie theaters showing brief frames of popcorn during 
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the movie. Even though the people in the theatre are not 
aware of the hidden message, the message reaches the uncon­
scious and induces them to purchase popcorn. Another example 
is found in department stores, where hidden messages against 
shoplifting are sometimes embedded in music piped in over 
the loudspeakers. In this experiment, we put hidden messages 
in the music in an attempt to alter your feelings toward X. 
Specifically, the message attempted to (increase, decrease) 
your preference toward X, as measured by the psychogalvanic 
skin response. Just as a demonstration, X have another tape 
in which the hidden messages are enhanced so that they're 
clearly audible." [Play demonstration tape.] 
[For NO FEEDBACK groups, the experimenter introduces Session 2 
as done with the CONTROL groupJ 
EFFECTIVE FEEDBACK 
"The psychogalvanic skin response showed that, in your 
case, the hidden message was very effective in influencing 
your feelings towards X. Your readings show a definite 
(decrease, increase) during the times that you were partici­
pating in X. Your readings were much (lower, higher) for X 
than they were for Y and Z. So these psychogalvanic skin 
response data show that the subliminal message was very 
effective in influencing your attitude toward X. 
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INEFFECTIVE FEEDBACK 
"The psychogalvanic skin response showed that, in your 
case, the hidden message was not at all effective in influ­
encing your feelings towards X. There was no definite 
in rease or decrease in your psychogalvanic readings when 
you were participating in X. Your readings for X were the 
same as your readings for Y and Z. So these psychogalvanic 
skin response data show that the subliminal message was not 
at all effective in influencing your attitude toward X." 
[For FEEDBACK groups, the experimenter introduces Session 2 
as was done with the CONTROL group .J 
[At the end of Session 2, the experimenter returns with 
the questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, the 
subject is debriefed, thanked, and excused.] 
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Transcripts of Demonstration Tapes 
"Encourage" tape: 
5 sees music 
"Play with the . The is the best 
game." 
5 sees music 
"You'll enjoy the best. Don't bother with 
the other games." 
5 sees music 
"You really enjoy the . The 
is the very best game." 
"Discourage" tape: 
5 sees music 
"Do not play with the . The 
is the worst game." 
5 sees music 
"You will not enjoy the . The other games 
are more interesting." 
5 sees music 
"You really do not like the . The 
is the very worst game." 
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[The experiment is introduced as in Experiment I. None of 
the subjects are given any GSR Feedback. The LOW SALIENCE 
and HIGH SALIENCE instructions below follow Session 1.] 
LOW SALIENCE 
This experiment is an investigation of people's ability 
to detect subtle auditory stimulation. In a technique 
called subliminal stimulation, verbal messages are embedded 
in background music. These messages are recorded in the 
music track at a low volume. Theoretically, the message may 
get through even though the individual may not be aware of 
hearing the message. 
Many psychologists have recently become interested in 
people's ability to detect subtle stimuli. For example, 
cases of "mind reading" may be explained scientifically if 
it can be demonstrated that the so-called "mind reader" is 
really simply responding to subtle nonverbal communications. 
In another example, the ability to predict changes in the 
weather may simply occur because of a perception of slight 
changes in barometric pressure. These kinds of phenomena 
have stimulated research into the sensitivity to subtle cues. 
Th'e present experiment is designed to investigate some 
of the variables that determine the efficacy of subliminal 
stimulation. The music that was playing contained low-volume 
messages directed towards changing your attitude towards X. 
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Specifically, the message attempted to (increase, decrease) 
your preference towards X, as measured by the psychogalvanic 
skin response. [Experimenter plays demonstration tape.] 
HIGH SALIENCE 
This experiment is an investigation of a form of mind 
control called subliminal persuasion. In subliminal per­
suasion techniques, commands to act in a particular way 
or to believe in certain ideas are embedded in background 
music. These commands are recorded in the music track at a 
low volume. Theoretically, the commands can exert mind 
control even though the individual may not be aware of hear­
ing the commands. 
Many people have become concerned that subliminal per­
suasion techniques may be used in brainwashing campaigns. 
For example, advertisers may use subliminal persuasion in 
an attempt to force people to purchase products against 
their will. In another example, it has recently been charged 
that some records and tapes contain subliminal commands in 
an attempt to coerce teenagers into believing certain reli­
gious or political doctrines. 
The present experiment is designed to investigate some 
of the variables that determine the efficacy of subliminal 
persuasion. The music that was playing contained low-volume 
messages directed towards changing your attitude about X. 
Specifically, the message attempted to (increase, decrease) 
your preference towards X, as measured by the psychogal 
vanic skin response. [Experimenter plays demonstration 
tape.] 
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[All procedures are identical to those of the first two 
studies, except for the instructions at the end of Session 1, 
be low .J 
ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS: 
"OK, , now that we've finished, I can explain 
to you more fully what this experiment is all about—I didn1t 
tell you all the details earlier." 
"This experiment is an investigation of a form of mind 
control called subliminal persuasion. In subliminal per­
suasion techniques, commands to act in a particular way or 
to believe in certain ideas are embedded in background music. 
These commands are recorded in the music track at a low vol­
ume, so softly that the person listening to the music is 
usually not even aware of the commands." 
"Research has shown that subliminal persuasion tech­
niques can be very powerful in influencing attitudes and 
behavior. Previous experiments have shown that a wide variety 
of attitudes and behaviors can be changed in this way, even 
though the listener is not aware of hearing the subliminal 
communications." 
[The experimenter then reads either the Positive or Negative 
Context instructions.j 
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Positive and Negative Context Instructions 
POSITIVE: 
"Psychologists have recently become very interested in 
subliminal persuasion because of its potential for helping 
people. For example, subliminal persuasion has been used 
to help people quit smoking and lose weight. Subliminal 
messages urging people to have confidence in their ability 
to overcome these problems are embedded in background music 
at certain weight-control and smoking clinics. In another 
example, subliminal persuasion has been used to treat 
depressed patients. Depressed people often have very low 
self-esteem; subliminal persuasion can be used to encourage 
the patients to value themselves as human beings. Finally, 
there is some evidence that subliminal persuasion may help 
hyperactive children in schoolwork. The subliminal messages 
encourage the children to concentrate on their work and to 
keep trying even if the work sometimes seems difficult." 
"The present experiment is designed to investigate some 
of the factors involved in subliminal persuasion. The music 
that was playing earlier (indicate tape deck) contained low-
volume messages directed towards changing your attitude 
about X. Specifically, the message attempted to (increase, 
decrease) your preference towards X, as measured by the psy­
chogalvanic skin response." 
[Experimenter then plays the tape "demonstrating" subliminal 
messages, and initiates Session 2 J] 
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NEGATIVE: 
"Psychologists have recently become very interested in 
subliminal persuasion because of its potential as a means 
of abusing human rights. For example, it has recently been 
charged that the Soviet Secret Police may be using sublim­
inal persuasion to indoctrinate school children to Communist 
propaganda. In another example, some cults are accused of 
using subliminal persuasion to recruit young men and women. 
Young people are invited to a cult for a visit, then exposed 
to subliminal messages encouraging them to abandon their 
values of family, religion, and country. Finally, there is 
some evidence that unscrupulous merchants may use subliminal 
persuasion to get shoppers to buy low-quality products that 
otherwise probably wouldn't be sold. Music in the store 
loudspeakers may contain messages encouraging people to buy 
shoddy goods." 
"The present experiment is designed to investigate some 
of the factors involved in subliminal persuasion. The music 
that was playing earlier (indicate tape deck) contained low-
volume messages directed towards changing your attitude 
about X. Specifically, the message attempted to (increase, 
decrease) your preference towards X, as measured by the psy­
chogalvanic skin response. 
[Experimenter then plays the tape "demonstrating" subliminal 
messages, and initiates Session 2.] 
APPENDIX F 
TABLES 
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Table 1 
Summary of the Relationship Between Prior 
Reinforcement/Incentive Effects and 
Post-Reward Measures of Intrinsic Motivation 
A. No reinforcement data presented; 
Anderson et al., 1976 
Arnold, 1976 
Calder & Stow, 1975 
Danner & Lonky, 1981 
Deci, 1972 
Farr et al. , 1977 
C. Fisher, 1978 
Harackiewicz, 1979 
Karniol & Ross, 1977 
Kruglanski et al., 1971 
McLolyd, 1979 
Morgan, 1981 
Pittmann et al., 1977 
Rosenfield et al., 1977 
Swann & Pittmann, 1977 
B. Overiustification effects occurred without prior rein­
forcement/incentive effects; 
Boggiano & Ruble 
Deci, 1971,. Exp. II 
Deci, 1972 (reinforcement data 
reported in Deci et al., 1975) 
Dollinger & Thelen 
Enzle & Ross, 1978 
Lee et al., 1976 
Lepper et al., 1973 
Pritchard et al., 1977 
Ross, 1975 
Ross et al., 1976 
Smith & Pittmann, 1978 
Weiner & Mander, 1978 
C. Overiustification effects occurred following prior rein­
forcement/incentive effects: 
Cars tens et al. , N*l<s 1 
Carstens & Seta -2. 
E. Fisher, 1979 
Fuoco, Note (token rewards) 
Greene et al., 1976 (low 
initial value activity) 
Lepper & Greene, 1975 
Loveland & Olley, 1979 
D. Overiustification effects did not occur following prior 
reinforcement/incentive effects; 
•Davidson & Bucher 
Feingold & Mahoney 
*Fuoco (praise and praise + 
token reward) 
Greene t al., 196 (high 
initial value activity) 
*Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975, 
Exp. II 
Williams, 1980 
*Post-reward measures indicate increase in intrinsic motiva­
tion. 
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Table 2 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings on Q8b, Experiment I: 
The Higher the Number, the Higher the Reported Effect 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Table 3 
ANOVA Summary Table, Ratings on Q8b, Experiment I 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 57 
B = GSR Feedback, 
CO II ,
Q 
n = 8-10 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 0.749 0.749 < 1 
B 2 114.959 57.479 12.37** 
AB 2 5.637 , 2.819 < 1 
S/AB 51 236.900 4.645 
Total 56 358.246 
Ineffective No Feedback • Effective 
1.6 2.6 5.0 
1.3 (n=9) 3.7 5.0 (n=8) 
**£ <.01 
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Table 4 
Mean Estimates of the Percentage of Time Spent on the 
Target Activity During Session 1, Experiment I (Q5) 
Ineffective No Feedback Effective 
Encourage 35.5 22.8 (n=9) 46.5 
Discourage 28.9 (n=9) 27.3 27.0 
Control 32.3 
Table 5 
ANOVA Summary Table, Estimates of the Percentage of Time Spent 
on Target Activity During Session 1, Experiment I (Q5) 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 58 
B = GSR Feedback, b = 2 n = 9-10 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 849.724 849.724 5.80* 
B 2 1329.786 664.893 4.54* 
AB 2 1355.429 677.714 4.63* 
S/AB 52 7615.544 146.453 
Total 57 11150.483 
*2 <.05 
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Table 6 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings of "Interest" and "Enjoyment" 
of the Target Activity (Q1 + Q9), Experiment I 
Ineffective No Feedback Effective 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
12.8 10.1 14.7 
11.2 9.2 9.7 
14.6 
Table 7 
ANOVA Summary Table, Likert Scale Ratings of "Interest" and 
"Enjoyment" of the Target Activity (Q1 + Q9), Experiment I 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 60 
B = GSR Feedback, b = 3 n = 10 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 93.750 93.750 3.76* 
B 2 80.433 40.217 8.76** 
AB 2 48.100 24.050 2.25 
S/AB 54 577.900 10.702 
Total 59 800.183 
*E <-05 
**2 <-01 
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Table 8 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings of Whether the Target Activity Was 
Performed Because It Was "Enjoyable" (1) or for "Other 
Reasons" (9.) Q13, Experiment I 
GSR Feedback 
Ineffective No Feedback Effective 
Encourage 
Discourage 
2.9 4.9 CO
 
00
 
4.1 5.0 3.1 
3.1 
Table 9 
ANOVA on Responses to Q13, Experiment I 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 n = 10 
B = GSR Feedback, b = 2 N = 60 
SV df SS MS F ' 
A 1 0.600 0.600 < 1 
B 2 29.033 14.517 2.28 
AB 2 9.100 4.550 < 1 
S/AB 54 343.200 6.356 
Total 59 381.9333 
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Table 10 
Mean Number of Intervals in which the Subjects Performed 
the Target Activity During Session 2, Experiment I 
GSR Feedback 
Ineffective No Feedback 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Effective 
o
 • 
CO CO • 
<£
> 
12.8 
2.1 4.8 6.4 
Control 11.1 
Table 11 
ANOVA Summary Table, Number of Intervals in which the Subjects 
Performed the Target Activity, Session 2,•Experiment I 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 60 
B = GSR Feedback, 
00 II fi
t 
n = 10 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 340.817 340. 817 5. 39* 
B 2 238.033 119. 017 1. 88 
AB 2 58.033 29. 017 <1 
S/AB 54 3412.100 63. 187 -
Total 59 4048.983 
*£ <.05 
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Table 12 
Mean Number of Intervals in which the Subjects Performed 
Any of the 3 Experimental Activities 
during Session 2, Experiment I 
Ineffective No Feedback Effective 
Encourage 
Discourage 
24.8 24.7 24.8 
22.7 20.7 20.5 
Control 27.4 
Table 13 
ANOVA Summary Table, Number of Intervals in which the Subjects 
Performed any of the 3 Experimental Activities 
during Session 2, Experiment I 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 60 
B = GSR Feedback, b = 2 n = 10 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 180.266 180.266 1.18 
B 2 15.433 7.716 < 1 
AB 2 14.234 7.117 < 1 
S/AB 54 8242.0 152.630 
Total 59 8451.933 
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Table 14 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings on Q8b; Experiment II: 
The Higher the Number, the Higher the Reported Effect 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Low Salience High Salience 
2.29 2.50 
n=7 n=8 
2.50 3.75 
n=8 n=8 
Table 15 
ANOVA Summary Table, Likert Scale Ratings 
on Q8b, Experiment II 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 32 
B = Salience, 
<N II fit n = 7-8 
SV df ss MS F 
A 1 4.069 4.069 <1 
B 1 4.069 4.069 <1 
AB 1 2.352 2.352 <1 
S/AB 28 136.929 4.890 
Total 31 147.419 
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Table 16 
Mean Estimates of the Percentage of Time Spent on the Target 
Activity during Session 1, Experiment II (Q5) 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Low Salience High Salience 
30.62 22.50 
n=8 n=8 
28.89 23.75 
n=9 n=8 
Control 26.87 
Table 17 
ANOVA Summary Table, Estimates of the Percentage of Time 
Spent on the Target Activity during Session 1, 
Experiment II (Q5) 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 33 
B = Salience, b = 2 D
 II 00
 
I 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 0.070 0.070 < 1 
B 1 356.960 356.960 1.40 
AB 1 18.950 18.950 <1 
S/AB 29 7398.260 255.110 
Total 32 7774.240 
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Table 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings of " 
of the Target Activity (Q1 
18 
Interest" and "Enjoyment" 
+ Q9), Experiment II 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
Low Salience High Salience 
11.78 8.67 
11.89 10.11 
9.22 
Table 19 
ANOVA Summary Table, Likert Scale Ratings of "Interest" 
and "Enjoyment" of the Target Activity 
(Q1 + Q9), Experiment II 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 5.444 5.444 <1 
B 1 53.778 53.778 2.78 
AB 1 4.000 4.000 <1 
S/AB 32 619.333 19.354 
Total 35 682.556 
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Table 20 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings of Whether the Target Activity 
Was Performed Because It Was "Enjoyable" (1) or 
for "Other Reasons" (9.) Q13, Experiment II 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Low Salience High Salience 
4.89 6.11 
3.44 4.67 
Control 5.44 
Table 21 
ANOVA on Responses to Q13, Experiment II 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 n = 9 
B = Salience, b = 2 ' N = 36 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 18.778 18.778 2.78 
B 1 13.444 13.444 1.99 
AB 1 0 0 < 1 
S/AB 32 216.000 6.75 
Total 35 248.222 
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Table 22 
Mean Number of Intervals in which the Subjects Performed 
the Target Activity during Session 2, Experiment II 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
Table 23 
ANOVA Summary Table, Number of Intervals in which the Subjects 
Performed the Target Activity, Session 2, Experiment I 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 36 
B = Salience, - b = 2 n = 9 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 96.694 96.694 1.36 
B 1 156.250 156.250 2.20 
AB 1 568.028 568.028 7.99* 
S/AB 32 2273.778 71.056 
Total 35 3094.750 
*£ <-01 
Low Salience High Salience 
15.78 3.67 
4.56 8.33 
5.22 
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Table 24 
Mean Number of Intervals in which the Subjects Performed 
Any of the 3 Experimental Activities 
during Session 2, Experiment II 
Low Salience High Salience 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
Table 25 
ANOVA Summary Table, Number of Intervals in which the 
Subjects Performed Any of the 3 Experimental 
Activities during Session 2, Experiment II 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 N = 36 
B = Salience, b = 2 n = 9 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 132.250 132 .250 <1 
B 1 240.250 240.250 1.56 
AB 1 521.361 521.361 3.38* 
S/AB 32 4933.111 154.196 
Total 35 5826.972 
*£ .10 
26.00 13.22 
22.22 24.67 
/ 
22.33 
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Mean Likert Scale 
The Higher 
the 
Table 26 
Ratings on Q8b, 
the Number, the 
Reported Effect 
Experiment III: 
Higher 
Positive Negative 
Encourage 
Discourage 
3.54 3.60 
n=13 n=15 
3.83 3.62 
n=12 n=13 
Table 27 
ANOVA Summary Table, Likert Scale Ratings 
on Q8b, Experiment III 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 n = variable 
B = Affective Context, b = 2 N = 53 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 0.29 0.29 < 1 
B 1 0.07 0.07 <1 
AB 1 0.26 0.26 < 1 
S/AB 49 239.57 4.89 
Total 52 240.19 
\ 
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Table 28 
Mean Estimates of the Percentage of Time Spent on the Target 
Activity during Session 1, Experiment III (Q5) 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
Positive Negative 
38.52 32.33 
26.20 32.67 
32.67 
Table 29 
ANOVA Summary Table, Estimates of the Percentage of Time 
Spent on the Target Activity during Session 1, 
Experiment III (Q5) 
A = Subliminal / a = 2 . n = 15 
B = Affective Context, b = 2 N = 60 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 540.000 540.000 2.64 
B 1 0.266 0.266 <1 
AB 1 601.667 601.667 2.94* 
S/AB 56 11468.800 204.733 
Total 59 12610.733 
*£ <£.10 
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Table 30 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings of "Interest" and 
"Enjoyment" of the Target Activity 
(Q1 + Q9), Experiment III 
Positive Negative 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
12.27 11.13 
9.87 12.73 
11.93 
Table 31 
ANOVA Summary Table, Likert Scale Ratings of "Interest" 
and "Enjoyment" of the Target Activity 
(Q1 + Q9), Experiment III 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 n = 15 
B = Affective Context, b = 2 N = 60 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 2.400 2.400 <1 
B 1 11.267 11.267 <1 
AB 1 60.000 60.000 4.16* 
S/AB 56 807.333 14.417 
Total 59 881.000 
*£ <.05 
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Table 32 
Mean Likert Scale Ratings of Whether the Target Activity 
Was Performed Because It Was "Enjoyable" (1) or for 
"Other Reasons" (9.) Q13, Experiment III 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
Positive Negative 
3.60 5.40 
5.07 4.13 
5.00 
Table 33 
ANOVA on Responses to Q13, Experiment III 
A = Subliminal, a = 2 n = 15 
B = Affective Context, b = 2 N = 60 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 0.150 0.150 <1 
B 1 2.817 2.817 <1 
AB 1 28.017 28.017 4.36* 
S/AB 56 359.867 6.426 
Total 59 390.850 
*J2 <-05 
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Table 34 
Mean Number of Intervals in which the Subjects Performed 
the Target Activity during Session 2, Experiment III 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Positive Negative 
8.20 5.07 
4.47 12.07 
Control 6.73 
Table 35 
ANOVA Summary Table, Number of Intervals in which the 
Subjects Performed the Target Activity during 
Session 2, Experiment III 
A = Subliminal, 
B = Affective Context, 
a = 2 
b = 2 
n = 15 
N = 60 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 40.017 40.017 <1 
B 1 74.817 74.817 1.14 
AB 1 432.017 432.017 6.56* 
S/AB 56 3688.000 65.857 
Total 59 4234.850 
*E <-025 
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Table 36 
Mean Number of Intervals in v/hich the Subjects Performed 
Any of the 3 Experimental Activities 
during Session 2, Experiment III 
Positive Negative 
Encourage 
Discourage 
Control 
18.20 19.07 
23.53 21.53 
24.47 
Table 37 
ANOVA Summary Table, Number of Intervals in which the 
Subjects Performed Any of the 3 Experimental 
Activities during Session 2, Experiment III 
A = Subliminal / a = 2 n = 15 
B = Affective Context, b = 2 N = 60 
SV df SS MS F 
A 1 228.150 228.150 1.30 
B 1 4.816 4.816 <1 
AB 1 30.817 30.817 <1 
S/AB 56 9794.800 174.907 
Total 59 10058.583 
